What Ethiopia needs is an independent prosecution

 By Adem K Abebe

Abiy Ahmed's ambitious reform agenda cannot succeed unless the office of the Attorney General is depoliticised

More than a year after his rise to power, the honeymoon period for Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has finally come to an end. Following the federal government's relatively strong response to a failed "coup" in the Amhara Regional State, prominent national and international media and watchdogs have raised concerns over a possible lapse to old habits of mass arrests and internet shutdowns in Ethiopia - a past Abiy has sought vehemently to distance himself from.
Since taking power in April 2018, the reformist prime minister has taken a series of confidence-building measures, including releasing thousands of political prisoners, facilitating the return of exiled political groups, some of them armed, and initiating legal reforms aimed at enabling and institutionalising a transition to a democratic dispensation.
He also ended the no-war-no-peace impasse with Eritrea and recently contributed to the breakthrough agreement between the Transitional Military Council and opposition forces in Sudan.
The last few months have, however, brought to the fore the complexity of governing Africa's second-most populous country where ethnic cleavages have high political saliency. The initial euphoria that followed Abiy's unexpected rise to power gradually transformed into bewilderment and even pessimism in some quarters.
The prime minister has faced criticism, especially because of the perceived deterioration of the security situation and inter-ethnic skirmishes, which partly contributed to the rise in the number of internally displaced persons.

Growing setbacks for Abiy's reform agenda

Perhaps the most obstinate challenge facing Ethiopia is the escalation of militant ethnic nationalism and regional irredentism in the context of a historically authoritarian political culture bereft of experiences of inter-ethnic or even intra-ethnic dialogue and compromise.
Reports of armed attacks by forces that claim to be associated with the Oromo Liberation Front; excessive tension and a war of words between officials of Amhara and Tigray Regional States; and contestations over the governance and "ownership" of Addis Ababa have compounded the already challenging nascent transition from decades of authoritarianism.
The aspirations of the Sidama ethnic group for internal secession to form a new regional state, which will be put to a vote in a referendum planned for the end of the year, have further exacerbated the tense political situation and could potentially worsen the volatility.
The intensity of the situation has pitted the short term demands of law enforcement to ensure relative political stability and security against Abiy's declared path of strategic patience as a necessary compromise to nurture a nascent democracy.

Finding himself between a rock and a hard place, the prime minister appears increasingly frustrated and out of patience. This is notable in the rapid change of tone in his language. In a recent address before the Ethiopian Parliament, Abiy declared that he was ready to confront lawlessness and challenges to Ethiopia's sovereignty "not with a pen, but with a Kalashnikov".
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the dangerous level of ethnic militarisation and extremism was the assassination of high-level government officials in the Amhara Regional State, which the government labelled a failed regional "coup", and the killing of the head of the army and a retired general in Addis Ababa. Following these gloomy incidents, the government has overseen the arrest of hundreds of individuals, including prominent journalists and politicians, and plans to charge some of them under the notorious anti-terrorism legislation.

Abiy had received acclaim for acknowledging state terrorism and promising to reform the anti-terrorism legislation. By resorting to such a discredited legal weapon, therefore, the government is creating the impression that his government is hearkening back to the brutal ways of the old regime, and is signalling the stalling or even reversal of his transformation agenda.
declared path of strategic patience as a necessary compromise to nurture a nascent democracy.
Finding himself between a rock and a hard place, the prime minister appears increasingly frustrated and out of patience. This is notable in the rapid change of tone in his language. In a recent address before the Ethiopian Parliament, Abiy declared that he was ready to confront lawlessness and challenges to Ethiopia's sovereignty "not with a pen, but with a Kalashnikov".

Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the dangerous level of ethnic militarisation and extremism was the assassination of high-level government officials in the Amhara Regional State, which the government labelled a failed regional "coup", and the killing of the head of the army and a retired general in Addis Ababa. Following these gloomy incidents, the government has overseen the arrest of hundreds of individuals, including prominent journalists and politicians, and plans to charge some of them under the notorious anti-terrorism legislation.

Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the dangerous level of ethnic militarisation and extremism was the assassination of high-level government officials in the Amhara Regional State, which the government labelled a failed regional "coup", and the killing of the head of the army and a retired general in Addis Ababa. Following these gloomy incidents, the government has overseen the arrest of hundreds of individuals, including prominent journalists and politicians, and plans to charge some of them under the notorious anti-terrorism legislation.
Abiy had received acclaim for acknowledging state terrorism and promising to reform the anti-terrorism legislation. By resorting to such a discredited legal weapon, therefore, the government is creating the impression that his government is hearkening back to the brutal ways of the old regime, and is signalling the stalling or even reversal of his transformation agenda.
Coupled with a days-long internet blockade following the failed "coup" and Abiy's change of rhetoric, the arrests have raised concerns over possible setbacks to the reform agenda. Perhaps most damagingly, and regardless of the veracity of the claims, there is a narrative that the government is using the crisis as an opportunity to weaken prominent journalists, activists and politicians seen as propagating hardline Amhara nationalism.

Politicisation of the prosecution service

The escalation of ethnic politics and competition has no doubt fuelled suspicion of opportunistic political motivations behind the arrests and prosecutions. Nevertheless, there is a more fundamental reason that can explain the lack of trust in the decision to arrest and prosecute.
Under the Ethiopian legal framework, the ministry in charge of justice, the Office of the Attorney General, is a political appointee, and an ordinary part of the cabinet fully responsible to the head of government.

The office performs two principal functions: giving legal advice to the government and prosecuting crimes. While the first is a largely political role, the second is or should be a quintessentially legal function. Increasingly, countries around the world have taken measures to insulate the prosecutorial functions from political accountability and influence.

Unfortunately, the Ethiopian constitution makes no mention of the independence of the prosecution service. In practice, as well, the prosecution service is seen as an extension of political institutions.
As a result, while new and politically unaffiliated faces have been appointed to lead the judiciary and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia has been significantly reformed, the prosecution service has so far escaped attention. Nevertheless, without an independent prosecution, recourse to an independent judiciary would often be too little, too late.

The prosecution process is perhaps the most effective way to harass political opponents, even if ultimately the defendant wins in a court of law. The reform drive would, therefore, remain incomplete without the institutionalisation of an independent prosecution service.
The lack of formal guarantees of prosecutorial independence has fed perceptions of politicisation of the prosecution office. Indeed, the leaders of Tigray Regional State have refused to cooperate in the arrest of former high officials who are suspected of committing serious crimes, including the former head of the intelligence services, mainly because they consider the prosecution selective and politically motivated.

The recent wave of arrests following the attempted regional "coup" has triggered similar accusations of politicisation of the prosecution process. Regardless of the genuineness of these perceptions and accusations, the fact of the matter is that there is no institutional safeguard against politically motivated prosecutions.
Accordingly, a sustainable solution to the historical politicisation of the prosecution services and current fears of its continuity requires the adoption of legal (and constitutional) reforms to institutionally separate the prosecutorial functions from the political role of the Attorney General as legal adviser to the government.

The separate prosecution office should then be guaranteed independence in the same manner as the judiciary. This institutional separation and guarantee of prosecutorial independence would go a long way in establishing and strengthening trust in the office.
While such reform may not automatically liberate the prosecution service and mark the end of frivolous prosecutions, it would provide the foundations for an autonomous institution capable of serving the general public interest rather than the transient needs of the government of the day. It would also proactively preclude accusations of politicised prosecution.
Rather than signalling a reversal of the reform agenda, the controversy arising from the recent wave of arrests has unveiled the missing piece in Ethiopia's reform jigsaw. The country should take the opportunity to initiate reforms of the prosecution service and diminish its politicisation.


(Source: Al Jazeera)

Maximising Employment from Investment and Economic Growth in Tigray Regional State, North Ethiopia

An Outline Proposal and Discussion Paper by Makonnen Tesfaye; London, UK
(Global Society of Tigrayan Scholars(GSTS) Conference; Mekelle, Tigray; 28^th July - 1^st August 2019)

Harnessing Tigraian diaspora capital and remittances, and mobilizing knowledge networks to build productive capacities in Tigrai

1 - Introduction and Context
Employment, in particular youth unemployment, is increasingly becoming the key economic, social and political issue facing the Country, the Regional States and Tigray; and as such has been the fundamental driver of the current challenges of social unrest and political instability. The aim of the outline paper is to stimulate discussion and point out the direction of potential research and economic policy-making further towards the imperative of developing policies, strategies and programmes that focus on job creation in Tigray but equally relevant to the other Regions.
Ethiopia and the Regions, including Tigray, have achieved high, sustained and broadly inclusive economic growth during the last fifteen years, resulting in major infrastructure development, the provision of pro-poor social services and improved education and health outcomes. Major achievements include the significant reduction in poverty and improvement in life-expectancy. These, though, are facing strong headwinds in recent years due to the prevailing social unrest and political instability as well as strategically misaligned Government policies, such as the lack of adequate focus on developmental priorities. Therefore, it is crucially important to re-focus on the imperative of addressing the problems of unemployment and underemployment in Tigray in particular and Ethiopia in general.
The democratic developmental state model of the EPRDF’s economic development strategy is expressed by the Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP).   The overarching aim of GTP II is to secure broad-based, accelerated and sustainable economic growth and transformation by promoting an agriculture-based, manufacturing-led and export-focused development strategy. The GTP II set the objectives to:

• consolidate and further develop infrastructure development, in particular public sector led  projects;
• focus on agricultural development as the basis of economic growth emphasising  on  the need to increase agricultural investment, productivity and non-farm rural activities;
• promote the industrial sector as the leading sector  and stress the need to develop dynamic and private-sector led manufacturing industries; and
• increase exports of manufacturing goods with a goal of doubling exports in five years.

Yet, although employment creation is an important objective in the GTP I and II, the disproportionately lower job growth (that is the low employment elasticity of economic growth) has in recent years become a critical economic policy concern, including politically and socially, in the Country, Regions and Tigray. Hence, the crucial importance of enhancing current and developing new policies to promote economic growth that generates an adequate number of quality jobs by strengthening the investment-growth-employment nexus (Figure 1). This is with a view to enhancing the capacity of the economy to absorb the growing working-age population as well as to address currently high levels of unemployment and underemployment.
2- Statements of the Problems (at Macro, Mezzo and Micro Levels)

1. The underdeveloped productive capacity of the economy in Ethiopia and Tigray; and the challenges of absorbing into the economy the annual entry into the labour market of over two million  working age population in Ethiopia and over 200,000 in Tigray.
2. Challenging unemployment and employment indicators. Urban unemployment rates in Ethiopia and Tigray in 2018 were 19.1% and 21.5% respectively. Furthermore, challenging youth unemployment in urban areas, where 25.3% of young people aged 15-29 in Ethiopia and 27.8 % in Tigray were unemployed. Similarly, very challenging economic activity/labour force participation rates, employment rates and informal activity rates for Ethiopia and Tigray (Appendix 1).
3. The low volume and growth of employment generated in the industrial and manufacturing sectors.
4. Similarly, the relatively low volume of employment generated by micro and small enterprises (MSEs). For example, 144,107 jobs in Ethiopia and 31,556 in Tigray in 2017/18.
5. Lack of structural transformation of the economy, including the phenomenon of urbanisation without industrialisation and an under-developed agricultural sector.
6. The underperformance of the export sector, and the shortage of vital foreign exchange.
7. Growing government debt burden.
8. Creeping inflationary trends.
9. High level of rent-seeking economic activities, economic injustice and corruption. 
10. Impediments arising from the regulatory and bureaucratic environment.
11. The prospects of the slowing down of the economy, social unrest and political instability in recent years and their adverse impact on the economy, in particular on unemployment and economic activity rates in the Country and the Regions, including Tigray.

3 - Policy Framework for Linking Employment and Development of Productive Capacities
Without adequate and decent jobs, economic growth is unsustainable; and job creation without the development of productive capacities is equally unsustainable. “Productive capacities are the productive resources, entrepreneurial and technological capabilities and production linkages which together determine a country’s capacity to produce  goods and services and enable it to grow and develop” (UNCTAD 2013).  The process through which productive capacity is developed and its links to employment creation is depicted in Figure 2.
4 - Policies for Employment-Rich Growth: A Three-Pronged Approach to Job Creation
(i)  Macroeconomic Policies (Federally and Regionally)

• Fiscal policy to stimulate the development of productive capacities through financing public investment in physical and human capital. Hence, the importance of mobilising and diversifying domestic and foreign resources through appropriate and targeted incentive schemes. The partial privatisation of the “Effort” companies in Tigray should be commended, and it would mobilise and leverage additional private investment for the Region. It should be done in a transparent, economically and financially well-structured (e.g. without misappropriation of the public sector by private investors) and socially fair way so that equity is distributed amongst a broad class of investors.
• Harnessing Tigrayan diaspora capital and remittances, and mobilising knowledge networks to build productive capacities in Tigray. Mapping out the Tigrayan Diaspora including the setting up of an inventory of global Tigrayan knowledge networks, which builds on and complements the Global Society of Tigrayan Scholars(GSTS) by including professionals, managers, entrepreneurs, artists, sports people and community, social and faith leaders.
• Expanding the fiscal space, in particular widening the tax base and improving revenue collection.
• Monetary policy for non-inflationary economic environment, but importantly optimal credit policy to enable the growth of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Promoting microfinance institutions.
• Optimising foreign exchange policy, including the management of scarce foreign exchange.
• Enhancing the regulatory environment and promoting level-field competition.
• Improving business infrastructure and logistics.
• Tackling rent-seeking activities and promoting good governance.

(ii)  Enterprise Development, Industrial and Technology Policies

• Promoting the private sector as the engine of growth and job creation. Optimised and targeted incentive regimes. The importance of supporting and developing MSEs, including medium-sized businesses.
• Industrial policy designed to steer the economy towards structural transformation, by moving to higher-productivity and value added activities. 
• Promoting backward and forward linkages in production, in particular between agriculture and manufacturing.
• Focusing on labour-intensive industries, including agribusiness, textiles and clothing.
• Using “appropriate” technologies; enhancing technology absorption capabilities; and technological upgrading of the export sector. Developing science, technology and innovation centres; promoting research and development; and improving business-government-university partnerships.
• Identifying and building on the comparative advantages of Tigray, including the tourism, leisure, cultural and mining sectors as well as the production of “cash” crops (e.g. Sesame and Oilseeds) for export. Supporting and developing the service sector, which is labour intensive.
• Maximising the benefits of Industrial Parks as a tool for developing manufacturing and generating jobs. Mobilising domestic as well as foreign investors into the Industrial Parks (Appendix 2).
• Integrated rural development policy and programmes. Enhancing agricultural productivities, developing irrigation and promoting non-farming economic activities to generate rural jobs. Ensuring food sufficiency in the medium to the long-terms.

(iii)  Public Sector-led Job Creation
The importance of the Federal Government and the Tigray Regional Government playing the role of job creator either directly or indirectly, including:

• Public investment in infrastructure using labour-intensive techniques. Public infrastructure spending can be more directly employment-generating, including indirectly through higher multiplier effects within the economy.
• Promoting the construction and housing sector, which are labour intensive.
• Provision of public goods and services, and promoting the non-tradable sector, such as education and health services, which also generate employment.
• Labour-intensive Public Work Programmes (PWPs) that are well designed, resourced/financed and managed.

5 – Discussion Topics and Points

• Has employment been at the front-row of the Tigray Regional and Federal Government’s economic development strategy, or has it been subsumed under the investment, trade and economic growth strategies/imperatives? Is there a critical need for developing a holistic employment strategy that is also coherently integrated with the overarching economic development and transformation strategy?
• Even under the best scenarios of double or high-single digit economic growth, can the current set of policies and strategies alone (i.e. manufacture-led and export focused development strategy and the associated tool of Industrial Parks; the development of micro and small enterprises etc.) adequately address the needs of the number of people joining the labour market as well as the current very high level of unemployment and underemployment in urban and rural areas in Tigray and Ethiopia? 
• Do we have contingency employment policies and programmes on hand if the current state of the Ethiopian/Tigray economy further deteriorates resulting in more mass unemployment?
• What are the economic, social and political implications of very high youth unemployment in urban and rural areas? What needs to be done that is above and over of current set of economic policies, programmes and projects?
• What are the enhanced roles of the Tigray Regional/Federal Governments as creators of employment through public sector investment? Do we have a blue print? What are the resource mobilisation and financing implications? What are the prospects of being innovative in job creation schemes, programmes and strategies?
• What can Tigray and Ethiopia learn from other countries that successfully managed to maximise job creation from their economic growth and transformation?

AP(አ ፖ ) Notes

We think TPLF leaders are not prepared to meet the challengesof containing economic impoverishment in Tigray Regional State. There is a network of anti-Tigray elements working hand in hand with TPLF leaders. Tigray needs a progressive, liberal, democratic leadership. TPLF is a stalinist group and lacks the education and farsighted views to force any meaningful economic development in Tigray.

Tigray should bring all Tigrayans living outside Tigray for safety and security reasons (also political reasons as we need their labour and skills to develop our home land Tigray). There should beenough jobs, schools and accomodation to receive such a large number of Tigrayans to live in Tigray Regional State, which could become an independent country .The political leadership now in Mekelle is power hungry and is only interested in keeping their power. TPLF should involve all Tigrayans to shape their homeland and future country. The Opposition to TPLF should be allowed to participate in policy making.

It is reported that there are more than half a million people in Mekelle, around 600000 according to some sources. The Tigray Regional Government should improve infrastructure in Mekelle and other towns. There is little activity regarding building social accomodation. Tigray has only one cement factory. Tigray needs at least 5 more cement factories. The regional government should be able to build tens of thousands of cheap homes or flats to meet the demand of accomodation at nominal price. TPLF seems not ready to help Tigrayans. They build homes for propoganda consumption and to show case that they are doing something. But the leaders should meet the demands of all the residents coming to work and live in Mekelle or in other towns. The government officials should build at least 50000 homes every year in Mekelle and in other towns to meet the demand of accomodation.

Land grabbing should be stopped and land should be cheap. You cannot demand 1 million ETB to buy a 100 square meter land in Mekelle. Land should be given only to Tigrayans. Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Tigray. By making land cheaper, many Tigrayan families could build their own homes.

By the way the constructin sector can create hundreds of thousands of jobs. TPLF is not a practical group. They are very slow. They do not want to dirty themselves to build Tigray. I am ashamed to see TPLF officials acting as occupiers and colonisers. Some of TPLF leaders are from Eritrea and have less devotion to Tigray. Tigrayans are not against Eritreans but political decisions should be made by Tigrayans only.




 

The Ethiopian constitution should be changed unconstitutionally

By Shiferaw Abebe

There has been much talk lately about the Ethopian constitution – its contents, its applications, its defects, and the opportunity and the timing of making amendments to it.  There are several reasons why the constitution attracts attention and criticisms. To start with the obvious, it was crafted to custom fit TPLF’s ideology and political agenda.  It didn’t include the input and honest participation of Ethiopians at large and Amharas,in particular, whom TPLF viewed collectively as oppressors.  Like its predecessors, this constitution was superimposed on Ethiopians by a minority group who snatched power by force.

Second, the current constitution in Ethiopia  is an aberration – there is no other constitution like it anywhere in the world.  Even countries with larger numbers of (less intermarried and intermingled) ethnic groups have avoided framing their constitutions ethnically and for a good reason, namely to minimize inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. TPLF, on the other hand, framed the current political system and its legal instrument – the constitution – ethnically for the very purpose of creating division and tension among ethnic groups so that it could, as a minority group, rule the country with unmitigated tyranny.

Third, the current constitution is essentially undemocratic. The inclusion of human and democratic rights of citizens is nominal, not only in the practical sense, but also relative to other provisions in the constitution. The constitution bestows all sovereignty on nations, nationalities and peoples (Article 8) with full rights to self- government and representation in state and federal governments (Article 39.3), unconditional autonomy including the right to secede from the country (Articles 39.1) and ownership of land and other natural resources (Article 40). These articles are the foundations of the current political system, which in essence prevent the exercise of the democratic rights of individual citizens, for example,from organizing and forming a non-ethnic government at the local or the state level.
Fourth, even at the federal level, the House of the Federation is exclusively reserved for ethnic representatives (Article 61), not citizens as such, and the constitution also unmistakably presumes the right of ethnic groups to be represented in the House of Representatives, which,as we know, is currently fully occupied by ethnic representatives.  At this point, except through their ethnicity, individual citizens are virtually deprived of any practical avenue to be represented in the local, kilil, or federal executive and legislative bodies.

Fifth, whether one agrees with the above criticisms or not, one cannot deny the fact that the current constitution (or the political system it has legalized) hasnot worked for the country. Far from creating a harmonious relationships, it has given rise to more and deadly ethnic tensions and conflicts. The singular source of instability in the country today including the eviction and internal displacement of millions of Ethiopian is the constitutionally mandated ethnic political system.
Given the above, it appears there is a wide consensus at this point in time that the constitution needs a facelift of some kind. How much facelift or makeover it needs is open for debate and,in the final analysis, would be determined through political compromises. But, before getting there,two challenges -one technical and another substantive – would need to be resolved.  The technical challenge relates to how one would go about amending or changing the constitution.  Article 104 of the current constitution lays out how an amendment can be initiated and Article 105 how those amendments can be ratified. 
  
According to Article 104, a constitutional amendment can be initiated by two-thirds majority vote of either chambers of the federal legislature or if voted by one-third of the state councils. Article 104 also mentions of a discussion and decision by “the general public and those whom the amendment of the constitution concerns” but nothing on how this is implemented or play a part in the ultimate decision.
Once initiated, Article 105 stipulates two rules for ratifying an amendment. If an amendment involves Chapter Three of the constitution, it would require the support ofall state councils and two thirds of the House of Representatives and two third of the House of the Federation.  For Amendments in other parts of the constitution, two-thirds of the state councils and a combined two-thirds of the two chambers of the federal legislature would be required. In other words, Article 105 giveseach and every one of the nine state councils a veto power to kill any amendment under Chapter Three.

Chapter Three has two parts, the first dealing with human rights and the second with democratic rights, where Article 39 is contained and, obviously, the reason why TPLFmade this chapter sacrosanct.  Article 39 states, among other things:
Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession (39.1), and
Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments (39.3).
It follows, the current ethnic political system can last an eternity as long as these two sub-articles remain intact. TPLF’s trick of ensuring these articles remain untouchable is through Article 105that gives TPLF (and each of the other nine states) a veto power to kill any amendment to Article 39.

Amending or opening up the constitution…

Constitutional amendmentsas a rule involve adding or repealing specific articles, keeping the architecture and building blocks of the constitution intact. If the intent in Ethiopia’s case is to effect significant change to the current political system, the constitutional amendment route won’t do the job at all.As pointed out, removing the consequential articles using the constitutional rules (Articles 104 and 105) is virtually impossible.

The alternative, which TPLF conveniently omitted from the current constitution, is to open up the constitution for a fresh look, for a major overhaul. This would allow changing any part of the constitution including the amendment rules or rewriting the entire constitution.  This can and should be done but requires overcoming the substantive challenge to doing that, namely, having first a clear understanding or agreement on what kind of political system the country should have going forward.  A constitution does not create a political system; people or political players design or create the political system of a country, then draft a constitution to give it a legal basis. Back in 1995, TPLF didn’t draft the current constitution to create a new political system; that system was already put in place as soon as TPLF captured state power by the barrel of the gun in 1991.  It would betherefore incumbent on all those who would like to see a serious reform to the current political system to push or initiate the political level conversation about what that reform should look like before talking about a constitutional change.These are issues neither time nor the upcoming election will resolve or make easier.

Some, including Prime Minister Abiy, have argued that a constitution is supposed to be a long term document. True, but only in so far as it is drafted through a negotiated and widely consultative process, and in so far as it remains relevant.  In less than 90 years (i.e., since the first constitution was adopted in 1931), Ethiopia has had four constitutions, too many relative to other stable political systems. The reason is simply Ethiopia haswitnessed three different political systems in the past 50 years (monarchy, socialist, ethnocentric), which has made frequent constitutional changes unavoidable.  
Today, the country is once again at a crossroads in search of a stable political system.  After hundreds, if not thousands, lost their lives in the popular uprisings of 2016 and 2017, TPLF’s hegemony has been knocked down, but the system it erected to divide and rule the country is still intact. Despite the positive political changes witnessed in the past one year and a half, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the future and a growing discontentment with the state of peace and security currently.  Many are also worried that the Oromo Democratic Party is taking over TPLF’s hegemonic position, not necessarily or entirely based on facts, but because few trust the ethnic political system to be fair and impartial.

The relative democratic environment that exists today and the admirably civil political discourse we observe in formal venues, Ethiopian politicians should seize the opportunity and muster the courage to engage in an honest and free debate and negotiation to craft a new long lasting social contract for the country and let the Ethiopian people have their say freely for once!

It is no secret that some of the political playersare keen on maintaining the architecture of the current political system, while others are convinced reforming the current political system is an existential imperative for the country.Bridging these seemingly diametrically opposed positionsmay appear insurmountable, but it gives more reason for engaging in a real and honest dialogue today for otherwise these contradictions will blow up to an unmanageable scale soon or late.  No one can get everything they want, nor should anyone lose everything they stand for. There must be a negotiated solution, a compromise everyone will be fine to live with. There are good examples from around the world that could be instructive in a negotiated outcome where individual democratic rights thrive unhindered while ethnic equality and multiculturalism flourishes all at the same time.
All that is required is honesty, wisdom and courage.
Shiferawabebe1@gmail.com

The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Hizkiel Gebissa - Part II

Part II: The Plan to Destroy Ethiopia Gradually
By Gemechu Aba Biya
Whenever Hizkiel Gebissa is asked about secession, he equivocates, but he is a committed separatist.  He just doesn’t have the decency, integrity, or honesty to say it openly.He tries to cleverly camouflage his separatist intention, while actively working with like-minded individuals, groups, and political organizations to dismantle Ethiopia gradually, steadily, but systematically.
In 2016, he,along with Tsegaye Ararssa, and others co-authored the so-called Oromo National Charter.  The charter was intended to be a precursor of the constitution of an independent Oromia, much as the 1991 OLF-TPLF charter was a prelude to the 1995 EPRDF constitution, but because of bickering among the various political parties and opposition from academics, prominent individuals, and ordinary Oromos, the charter could not be approved as planned. This story was reported by Tamrat Negera, an Oromo journalist.
To bolster the proposed Oromo Charter, Hizkeil Gebissa and Jawar Mohammed suggested the establishment of an Oromo Transitional Government and an Oromo army.(See the letter addressed to them by the concerned Oromos).  That too fell apart when the various groups couldn’t agree on the people who should lead the implementation of the plan.  Some individuals, including Hizkiel,suggested to appoint the Little Ayatollah as the Supreme Leader of the Supreme Council, much to the chagrin of the supporters of Dowd Ibssa. (No, I didn’t make up the word Supreme Council. Check the link).He has not yet repudiated his separatist proposals.
Today, Hizkiel pretends to support a united and democratic Ethiopia, while making speeches, giving interviews, issuing statements, and plotting with others to advance Oromia’s separation. He has never taken an unequivocal stand on national unity. Every time he is asked about secession, he tries to be too clever by half by saying that he supports “self-rule”for the people of Oromo, which can mean an autonomous region within a united Ethiopia or an independent Oromia.
Equivocation on secession
In 2016, when someone asked him about secession, he feignsto be incensed by the question:
“To be sure, no one Ethiopian group has the moral authority to administer the litmus test of loyalty to Ethiopia. It is unfathomable that Oromos have to answer such questions especially in the wake of the sacrifices the young generation of Oromo have been paying to liberate Ethiopia from tyrannical rule.”
The false indignation is intended to divert attention from the question.Yes, in case Hizkiel has not noticed, some Oromos, including his boss Jawar, are so disloyal to Ethiopia that they have publicly vowedto destroy it to create an independent Oromia. He pretends to have never met a separatist Oromo. 

Hizkiel Gebissa

Second, the question of secession was addressed to him personally, not to all Oromos.  We know that the vast majority of the Oromo people oppose separation from Ethiopia because they realize that separation will be disastrous for the Oromo peopleand because they are patriotic Ethiopians as well.As usual, Hizkiel, like his fellow separatists, relies on hyperbole, mendacity, and stealth statements to advance Oromo separation. (For instance, Asafa Jalata the  OLF writer falsely claims that Emperor Menelik killed five million Oromos).
If fake outrage, hyperbole, and emotional manipulation are not enough, he tries obfuscation.  Hizkielobfuscates by saying ,“The issue of secession, for instance, was basically settled when federalism was chosen as a solution and secession was enshrined in the Ethiopian Constitution as a right in principle.”
This is the kind of non-answer you expect from aslimy, duplicitous politician, not from an honest, truth-seeking academic.  Someone who cannot give a simple “yes” or “no”answer to a simple question obviously hides something. 
Although he lacks the integrity to say that he supports secession outright, there is enough indirect evidence from his statements and actionsto conclude that he is still a separatist.  When he was recently asked about article 39 of the constitution at Mekele University on July 11 , he responded that he supports it.  It is most unlikely that an individual who supports national unity can in clear conscience also support article 39, unless he is a separatist.Just as you don’t buy a car, unless you intend to drive it, you don’t endorse article 39, unless you hope to invoke it one day.
To be sure, I recognize Hizkiel’s right to support separation, but what I detest is his dishonesty, sleaziness, mendacity, and hate mongering against the Amhara people to advance the separation of Oromia.
Further, he endorses the confederation of ethnic states that has recently been proposed by supporters of the TPLFto replace a sovereign Ethiopia, revealing his secessionist aspirations.Appearing on Tigray TV on July 13, Hizkeil gleefully asserts that the Killilsare ready to separate and the process of Ethiopia’s dissolution is underway. 
He points out that the Killils have their own constitution, their own police force, their own army (special forces), their own flags, and their own presidents.  He could have also added that Oromia and Tigray have their own ethnic national anthems as well!What is missing, he contends, is international recognition only.  And that can come easily once a referendum, requiring a simple majority vote for separation, is held. He can’t wait to see that day.
Defending the constitution
Hizkiel defends the constitution vigorously.  One wonders why he bloviates so much when defending the constitution, both its content and the process by which it was drafted and approved. The reason is simple: the constitution, written by the two separatist political organizations the OLF and TPLF, was conceived to destroy Ethiopia. He must share the same objective.
The constitution created the Killils, ethnic enclaves,with huge imbalances in the distribution of resources, economic power, and political influence, an unworkable federal arrangement in the long run.  It enshrined secession.It undermines Ethiopia’s national identity. It created indigenes and non-indigeneswithin each Killil who are subject to unequal rights. It includes provisions that incitecontinuousconflicts in each Killil. (Kebeles demanding to be woredas, woredas demanding to be zones, and zones demanding to be Killils, and Killils eventually demanding to be countries).
Because of these and other features, the constitution fosters perpetual political crises and the eventual collapse of Ethiopia.  Nobody could have designed a better constitution than the OLF-TPLF constitution for a countryto self-annihilate.  And this is the constitution that Hizkiel defends as being perfect for Ethiopia.  Indeed, it is a perfect constitution for the destruction of Ethiopia.
That’s why separatists like Hizkiel threatenviolence, bloodshed, civil war whenever you suggest to change the constitution.  This is intellectual bullying, the hallmark of someone who has no valid argumentsto defend atenuous position.
If the constitution provides the legal framework for the separationof Oromia in the future, then the ground political work must start now.  The separatistsare working to gradually dismantle Ethiopia, with the apparent connivance of the Abiy government.
Hizkiel, Jawar, and Bekele are now collaborating closely with the TPLF separatists.  They have formed an unholy alliance with the former oppressors, torturers, and killers of the Oromo people.  Hizkiel used to condemn the Woyane regime incessantly for its crimes against the Oromo people, but on August 7 he denies ever using the word “Woyane”! Come again?  A cursory look at his video clips over the last two decades shows he has profusely used the word “Woyane”.  The man a pathological liar. 
Two years ago, Hizkiel was telling us the alliance between the Amhara and Oromo people, deeply rooted in history, was essential for a united, democratic, and prosperous Ethiopia.  Now, he tells us that the alliance was simply tactical and that there can never be a strategic alliance between the two people. 
The strategic alliance,he argues, should be among the Cushitic people of Ethiopia, under the hegemony of the Oromos.  That has been his long-held position.  This means, when he was preaching the alliance of the two people, he was lying all along.  Now he wants to con the Cushitic people of Ethiopia, but they know him well enough not to be duped.
The man tells consistently contradictory stories, depending on whether he is speaking in Bale or Mekele, in Amharic or Afan Oromo, on Amhara TV or OMN TV, on Tigray TV or on Walta TV.  In Harar, he was advancing Oromo hegemony; in Mekele, he denounces it.  On Tigray TV, the thieves are the EPRDF leaders; on Walta TV, no it is the TPLF leaders. And so on.  Which is the true story?
For Hizkiel, truth is some kind of play dough to be arranged into different forms, patterns, and shapes; to be packaged, labelled, and sold to a particular audience.  The man has a serious problem of credibility, to put it politely. 
The great expanded Oromia?
The current configuration of Oromia is not economically conducive for an independent Oromia.  To be viable, it must incorporate the SNNPR.  To that end, Hizkiel and Jawar have been agitating for the fragmentation of the South not because they support the constitutional right of the people in the South, but because a divided, fragmented, and weakened South will be easy to dominate, to Oromize,and to eventually incorporate into Oromia. 
When Hizkiel and Jawar assert that Oromia is composed of different “nations, nationalities, and peoples”, they are not referring to the Amharas, Gurages, Tigrayans, and other ethnic groups living in Oromia today. They are referring to the people of the South.  Hizkiel wants to fragment the South but plans to expand Oromiaby incorporating Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Shewa, the South, Wollo, and substantial areas of the other regions.  Unless you’re a separatist who dreams to establish a Great Oromiaone day, why would you want to expand Oromia? 
Further, he relentlessly attacks Ethiopia’s national identity, spews ethnic hatred against the Amharas, strategizes to weaken the Amhara region, advocates the Oromization of non-Oromos, and instigates political crises by raising wedge issues (think of Finfinen Kegna and now Wollon Kenga). None of these advance national unity. In fact, they are designed to kill Ethiopia by a thousand cuts.
I doubt if the strategy of gradually weakening Ethiopia to destroy it,while strengthening Oromia economically, politically, and militarilyto make it an independent country will work because the Oromo people are beginning to realize the treachery of people like Hizkeil and Jawar and that separation is a mutually destructive option for all Ethiopians.
There is no guarantee that an independent Oromia would remain intact, given the cultural, political, regional, and religious differences of the Killil.  Still, we have to be vigilant about intellectually dishonest individuals like Hizkeil who pretend to support national unity while actively trying to destroy Ethiopia.  It’s our duty to expose such political hacks, charlatans, and carnival barkers.

The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Hizkiel Gebissa

Part I: Peddling Ethnic Hatred By Gemechu Aba Biya

ezekiel gebissa

In an interview on August 1 with Semeneh Biafers of Walta TV,Hizkiel  Gebissa  makes many deceitful statements, as he has done in the past.It’s time to take him to task.  He describes himself as a public intellectual dedicated to defending human rights in Ethiopia. But a glimpse of his interviews, speeches, and writings reveal that the man is neither an intellectual nor a human rights advocate; rather, he is an intellectually bankrupt and dishonest imposter.  To fully expose his bankruptcy and dishonesty requires several pages, probably a book.  Instead, I’ll choose a few examples to illustrate my point. 
Officially, Hizkiel is described as a professor of Liberal Studies (whatever that means) at Kettering University in the US but he calls himself a professor of history. He published his PhD dissertation as a book in 2004, Leaf of Allah: Khat and the Transformation of Agriculture in Harerge Ethiopia, 1875–1991. I suppose, this makes him an expert in the production, distribution, and consumption of khat in Harerghe.  I am not interested in reviewing his scholarly contribution on khat; I would leave that to the experts in the field.  My concern here is his consistentlydivisive, offensive, and untruthful statements about the political situation in Ethiopia, currently and in the past. 
Although his academic expertise is limited to khat, he presents himself as an expert on Ethiopian history and the political economy of countries in the Horn of Africa.  Unsurprisingly, his knowledge of Ethiopian history and political economy is demonstrably superficial. In a rare display of honesty, when asked by Semeneh about the ethnic background of emperor Menelik, Hizkiel responded that he does not know.Yes, it is true heknows little about Menelik or the history of Ethiopia.
Since Ethiopia’s history is outside his academic field, he can be forgiven for his scant understanding of Ethiopia’s rich history.  The issue is not the deficiency of his knowledge—that is a given; rather, it is his ostentatious pretensions, his deliberate distortion of facts,his fabrications of stories, and his fallacious arguments to advance his extremist nationalist agenda.   
In all of his interviews, he describes himself as a public intellectual dedicated to defending human rights in Ethiopia. Is he?  A public intellectual is an individual who is distinguished for his or her scholarly work and is engaged in advancing a just cause, whether it is economic, environmental, political, or social.  In the US, there are some well-known public intellectuals; for example, Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, Edward Said, and Cornell West. 
We may disagree with their politics, but we all admire their dedication, consistency, and scholarly work.  It will be unfair to compare him with them.  But it’s understandable how in the lala land of extremist nationalism, an intellectually mediocre imposter can become a star. In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king, as the saying goes.
A human rights activist consistently and meaningfully defends and promotes the human rights of all individuals in Ethiopia, irrespective of their ethnicity. Human rights activists often pay personal sacrifices for defending human rights violations; for example, being imprisoned.  Talk is cheap. It is difficult to call Hizkiel a human rights activist.  First, there is no evidence that he has contributed anything substantial to promote and protect human rights in Ethiopia. Second, he has paid no personal sacrifice for defending human rights in Ethiopia. He was teaching at Kettering while many human rights activists in Ethiopia were being tortured in jail. 
Third, his activism was at best limited to producing pamphlets or making speeches that denounced the TPLF government, selectively.Whenever the TPLF government violated the human rights of the Oromo people, he was quick to denounce the government, but when the human rights of non-Oromos were violated he was conspicuously silent.  Human rights activists don’t discriminate between victims of human rights abuses.
Fourth, under the Abiy government, his stand on human rights abuses are appalling.  When the mob that came out to welcome his boss Jawar Mohammad to Shashemene hanged an innocent young man upside down on August 13, 2018, Hizkiel chose to keep quiet.  The victim was a non-Oromo.  When followers the OLF and Little Ayatollah massacred close to 60 non-Oromos in Bourayou on September 17, 2018, once again Hizkiel chose to be silent.  Insteadof denouncing the massacre, he condemned the coverage of the news as an anti-Oromo propaganda campaign. 
Following the massacre, when the authorities in Addis Ababa arrested thousands of innocent youth and put them in a military camp, again he chose to keep quiet.  When 800,000 Gideons were displaced at the instigation of extremist Oromo nationalists in June 2018, Hizkiel kept quiet.  Once again, he characteristically denounced the efforts to raise funds for the victims as a propaganda ploy to discredit the Oromo people.  He has yet to denounce the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing.  Can such an individual be called a human rights activist?  No way, not even by a khat addict.
His selective denunciation reflects his ethnicist division of the Ethiopian people between “us”, the Oromos, and “them”, the non-Oromos.  A prejudiced activist cannot claim to be a human rights activist, even if we take his denunciation as activism.  He is an ethnicistcharlatan.
A human rights activist, even a self-proclaimed one at that, who by his silence indirectly sanctions massacres, mob hanging, mass incarceration, and ethnic cleansing acquiesces to the crime.  He is an enabler of crimes against humanity. 
A human rights activist works with the other fellow activists to advance a common cause, but Hizkiel attacks other human rights activists in Ethiopia who disagree with him politically.  He disparages non-Oromo activists who defend the rights of the citizens of Addis Ababa to elect their own mayor directly. He calls them hoodlums who engage in political terrorism.  His condemnation demonstrates that he is a political operative masquerading as a human rights activist.
Not only does he engage in selective denunciation, he spreads ethnic hatred.  In most of his political discussions, interviews, speeches, and writings he instigates conflict between Amharas and Oromos.  In an essay that appeared on Ethiomediaon October 20, 2016, he lists (by quoting another author) ethnic slurs directed at the Oromo more people supposedly by Amhara people, as an example of how the Amharas have oppressed, marginalized, and dehumanized the Oromo people for more than hundred years.
In the eyes of many Ethiopians, as Donald Donham keenly observed, the “Galla were pagans. They were uncivilized. Ye Galla chewa ye gomen choma yellem (it is impossible to find a Galla gentleman as it is to find fat in greens) or again Galla inna shinfilla biyatbutim aytera (even if you wash them, stomach lining and a Galla will never come clean).” In one Amharic expression, Oromos were equated with human feces: “Gallana sagara eyadar yegamal” (Galla and human feces stink more every passing day). In another, even Oromo humanity was questioned: “Saw naw Galla?” (Is it human or Galla?).
What was the purpose of listing these ethnic slurs?  Why stoop so low?The khat expert knowsthe purpose well: it is to create resentment, animosity, and hostility among Oromos against the Amhara people. But what he should have realized is that ethnic, racial, or regional slurs are not unique to Ethiopia.  They are ubiquitous elsewhere as well.  Still, intellectuals don’t resort to using slurs to bolster their arguments. 
I can list many Oromo ethnic slurs directed at Amharas, Keffas, Sidamas, or Somalis, but that will not strengthen whatever argument I am making other than fuelhatred.  Individuals like him who resort to using ethnic insults lack the intellectual capability to provide evidence-based arguments to support their dubious claims.
A sound argument based on verifiable premise, supporting evidence, and logical conclusion requires no emotional embellishment to convince its listeners or readers.  The appeal to emotion indicates once inability to produce sound arguments.  An individual who claims to defend human rights does not repeat offensive ethnic slurs.The use of ethnic slurs to advance a political agenda is unconscionable, objectionable, and deplorable.  A sane individual will not use ethnic slurs in any argument, unless one is under the influence of khat.
Human rights activists don’t incite ethnic violence, but Hizkiel ’s stock-in trade is inciting conflict, particularly between Amharas and Oromos, as I haveshown above.  Here is a more recent example.  In September 2018, appearing as a prop for Jawar as usual on OMN TV,he announced that there is a political party that is dedicated to exterminating the Oromo people.The message was loud and clear: The Oromo people should be ready to fight against the impending onslaught.This story was fabricated to incite violence between the Amhara and Oromo people.
The shameless Bekele Gerba repeated the fabricated story.  To his credit, Marara Gudina repudiated the story.A man who fabricates such a story cannot be human rights activist. He is a fraud. He is a criminal.  Had he told a similarlymanufactured story in the U.S, he would have been prosecuted for hate speech and put in jail.The khat expert has less integrity than that of a khat (drug) dealer.  The sooner people realize hisduplicity, particularly journalists, the lower the chances of people being duped by his deceptive, divisive, and conflict-inducing statements.

የትግራይን ህዝብ የሚጎዳ ፓለቲካ ይቁም

ዮሃንስ  አበራ (ዶር)

የትግራይ ህዝብ መልስ ያጣለት ነገር ቢኖር ያም ያም እየተነሳ ለምን እንደሚዝትበት ነው እንጂ ዋናው ማንነቱ የሆነው ኢትዮጵያዊ መሆን አለመሆን አይደለም። በኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ዲሞክራሲ ሰፍኖለት ሳይበደልና ሳይጨቆን የኖረ ህዝብ የለም። ትግራይን የጨቆነ መንግስት በሌላው ላይ ደግ ይሆናል ተብሎ አይታሰብም። ዴሞክራት ህዝብ አይመርጥም አምባገነንም እንዲሁ። የሚያዳላ ቢሆንም እንኩዋን የትግራይ ህዝብ ኢትዮጵያዊነቱን የጨበጠው ተፈጥሮአዊ ስለሆነ እንጂ በመደራደሪያነት አይደለም። ማስታወስ የሚገባን ነገር ቢኖር በራሱ ልጆች እጅ ሆኖ በነበረበት ሰላሳ አመትም ቢሆን መልካም አስተዳደር እንዳልታደለ ይታወቃል። መገንጠል ከልጆቹ እንኩዋን አጥቶት የኖረውን መልካም አስተዳደር አያስገኝለትም። ከሌላ ስለመጣ አይደለም ጭቆና ጭቆና የሚሆነው። የትግራይ ህዝብ ኢትዮጵያዊነትን ሲመረው የሚጥለው ሲደላው የሚያነሳው አይደለም። ኢትዮጵያዊ እንዳልሆነ ያህል አድርገው የሚሰድቡትን የሚያስፈራሩትን የሚታገላቸው ኢትዮጵያዊነቱን ጠንካራ ክንድ አድርጎ በመጠቀም እንጂ ዋናው ማንነቱን ጥሎ በመሸሽ አይደለም። ጀግናው የትግራይ ህዝብ ፈሪ የሚሆነው ማንነቱ የሆነውን ኢትዮጵያዊነትን ጥሎ የሄደ ቀን ነው፡፡

በአሁኑ ጊዜ ችግር ላይ የወደቀው የትግራይ ህዝብ ብቻ ነውን; የሚለው ጥያቄ ታዛቢና የደረሰበት ሁሉ የሚመልሰው ነው። የጋራ ችግር የጋራ ትግል ያስፈልገዋል። አሁን ያለው የኢትዮጵያ ችግር የፓለቲከኞች ቁርቁስ ያመጣው እንጂ ህዝቡ ምንም የሚያውቀው ነገር የለም። ተራው ህዝብ በሰላም እንደወትሮው አብሮ እየኖረና እየሰራ ነው። ለዚህ በቂ ማስረጃ የሚሆነው ከሰማንያ በላይ ብሄር የተወከለባት ትንሽዋ ኢትዮጵያ የሆነችው  አዲስ አበባን አንድ ቀን ወስደን ብንዘዋወር የህዝቡ መተሳሰብና መከባበር አገር ፈረሰ እያሉ ሽብር የሚነዙትን ፓለቲከኞች የሚያሳፍር ነው። የት ላይ እንደሚጠቀሙበት ማወቅ ያቃታቸው ግን የፓለቲካ ሳይንስ ምሁራን ነን ባዮች ከፈረኝጅ የተዋሱትን ፌይልድ ስቴት የሚለው ቃል ኢትዮጵያ ላይ አምጥተው ይለጥፉታል። ኢትዮጵያ ፌይልድ ስቴት አይደለችም መቸም አትሆንም። የብዙ ዘመናት የመንግስታዊ ስርአት ባህል ያላት አገር መንግስት ሊሳሳባትና ሊዳከምባት ይችላል እንጂ አትፈርስም። በኢትዮጵያ ታሪክ የመንግስት መዳከም አዲሰ ነገር አይደለም፡፡ ረብሻና መካረር በተፈጠረ ቁጥር የሚፈርስ አገር እኮ ድሮም በሙጫ ተጣብቆ የነበረ ከሆነ ነው። 

ህዝብን የሚያለሙትና የሚያጠፉት ፓለቲከኞች ናቸውና መቶ ሚልዮን ህዝብ ምን እየተፈጠረ እንደሆነ ሳይገባው በፓለቲከኞች የብተና ሽብር እየተነዛበት ነው። እንዲህ እንደቀላል ነገር የሚደጋግሙት ብተና ለፓለቲከኞቹ ስጋት ነው ወይስ መልካም አጋጣሚ ለመለየት ይቸግራል። ለትግራይ አንዳንድ ፓለቲከኞች ግን የአዝናኝ ጨዋታ ያህል የተመቻቸው ይመስላሉ። ካልሆነ የትግራይ ነፃ መንግስት መመስረት ነው! የሚለው አባባል በትግራይ ህዝብ ላይ ከፍተኛ ንቀት ማንፀባረቅ ነው።  ህዝበ ውሳኔ አካሂደውና መቶ ፐርሰንት እንገንጠል የሚል የትግራይ ህዝብ ድምፅ አገኝተው ለጋዜጠኞች ሪፓርት የሚያደርጉ ይመስላሉ። እነዚህ ዝና ፈላጊና ሃላፊነት የማይሰማቸው ፓለቲከኞች የሚናገሩትን የመገንጠል አስፈላጊነት ትርክት ከትግራይ ስድስት ሚልዮን ህዝብ ውስጥ ምን ያህሉ እየሰማ ይሆን; እንኩዋንና የብዙ ዘመናት ታሪክ ያለው የትግራይ ህዝብ ቀርቶ ወላጅ ስለልጁ ውሳኔ ሰጪ የሚሆነው አስራ ስምንት አመት እስኪሞላው ብቻ ነው። የመገንጠል ጥቅምና ጉዳት በሚገባ ያልተገነዘበን ህዘብ በስሜት አነሳስቶ ጀሮው ውስጥ እንደ ጣፋጭ ሙዚቃ ማንቆርቆር ወንጀል ነው፡፡  

መገንጠልን እንደቀላል መውጫ በር አድርገው የሚቆጥሩት የትግራይ አንዳንድ ፓለቲከኞች እየጎረሱ ያሉት ሊውጡ ከሚችሉት በላይ ነው። የመገንጠል ግብ እኮ መገንጠል አይደለም። የመገንጠል ግብ ራስን የሚሸከም ጠንካራ አንገት ያለው ነፃ አገር መፍጠር TKƒ ነው። ይህ ስራ ነብዩ እንዳለው ጎጆ የመቀለስ ያህል ቀላል አይደለም። መራራ እውነትን መቀበል ያስፈልጋል። አንዳንድ የትግራይን የኢኮኖሚ አቅም ማቃለል የሚወዱ ግለሰቦች ስለሚናገሩት ብቻ አሳፍሮን የምንደብቀው ነገር አይደለም። ትግራይ በአሁኑ ሁኔታዋ ራስዋን ችላ መቆም የምትችል ነፃ መንግስት ልትሆን አትችልም። በሌላ በኩልም እነዚህ የመገንጠል ፓለቲካ የሚያራግቡ ፓለቲከኞች ጨርሶ የዘነጉት አብይና ወሳኝ ነገር አለ። ስለ ትግራይ መገንጠል ሲናገሩ ሽግግሩ ሰላማዊ ይሆናል ብለው ማሰባቸው ነው። መገንጠልን የሚደግፉ እንዳሉ ሁሉ የማይደግፉ ግን ዝም ያሉት አብዝሃዎቹ እንደበግ ወደማይፈልጉት ነገር ተጎትተው መሄድን አሻፈረን ይሉና የማያባራ ግጭት ይፈጠራል።

ሌላው የቀሪው የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ስሜት ነው። የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ፈቃደኛ ካልሆነ የትግራይ የመገንጠል ውሳኔ በሰላማዊ መንገድ ይጠናቀቃል ብሎ ማሰብ የዋህነት ነው። አንቀፅ ሰላሳ ዘጠኝ ተግባራዊ የሚሆነው እኮ በመግባባት እንጂ በፀብ አይደለም። በፀብማ ሲሆን አንቀፁም ቁጥር ብቻ ህገ መንግስቱም የተረት መፅሃፍ ይሆናሉ። ህግ እኮ ተጠቃሚ ብቻ ሳይሆን አስፈፃሚም ያስፈልገዋል። ትግራይ የምትገነጠለው አገሪቱ ልትበተን ስለሆነ ነው ይላል መሓሪ ዮሃንስ። ኢትዮጵያ ልትበተን ከሆነ አንቀፅ ሰላሳ ዘጠኝ እንዲተገበር ውሳኔ እንዲሰጥ በህገ መንግስት ስልጣን የተሰጠው የፌደራል ከፍተኛ ፍርድ ቤት ህልውና ይኖረዋል; ምስጋና ስላልተቀበልን ኢትዮጵያ እንዳትበተን ጥረት አናደርግም የሚለው የመሓሪ አባባል በሰላም ጊዜ ቢሆን ኖሮ በአገር ክህደት ወንጀል (ትሪዝን) ያስከስሰው ነበር። ማንም ዜጋ የሃገሩን ደህንነትና የግዛት አንድነት የመጠበቅ ውዴታ ሳይሆን ግዴታ አለበት።  ይህ እንኩዋን ከፓለቲካ ሳይንስ ምሁር ትምህርት ካልነካ ሰውም አይጠበቅም። አገርን ከአደጋ መጠበቅ ተመስጋኙ ማነው፣ አመስጋኙስ ማነው? ይህን እያሰቡ አልነበረም ኢትዮጵያን ለመጠበቅ በየጦር ሜዳው ስንት ጀግኖች የወደቁት።

የምስጋና ነገር ሲነሳ የትግራይ ፓለቲከኞች ሌላውን ከመውቀሳቸው በፊት መጀመሪያ ራሳቸው ምስጋናን መማር አለባቸው። ምስጋና ማለት ውድ የሆነ ሃውልትና አዳራሽ ገንብቶ ስም ዝርዝር መለጠፍ አይደለም። ምስጋና ማለት በሺዎች ደም የተገኘውን ለግል ቅንጦት መጠቀም አይደለም። ምስጋና ማለት በህይወት ያሉት የጦር ጉዳተኞችና የስውአን ቤተሰቦችን እንደ መብታቸው ሳይሆን ምፅዋት ተቀባዮች እንዲሆኑና አሁን ከበርቴ የሆኑት የቀድሞ የትግል ጉዋዶቻቸው በጎ አድራጎት እንዲጠብቁ ማድረግ አይደለም፣ ምስጋና ማለት በትግሉ የመከራ ገፈት ቀማሽ ሆኖ የቆየውን የትግራይን ህዝብ ችላ በማለት ሃብት ከማጋበስ በስተቀር ህዝባቸውን የማገልገል ችሎታና ፍላጎት ለሌላቸው አስተዳዳሪዎች ትቶ አዲስ አበባ ላይ የድሎት ኑሮ መመስረትና ትግራይን ዘንግቶ በፌደራል የስልጣን ሽኩቻ ላይ መጠመድ አይደለም። እንዲደረግብህ የማትሻውን በሌላው ላይ አታድርግ ይላል ታላቁ መፅሓፍ።

ሰሞኑን አዲስ አበባ የሚኖሩ ትውልዳቸው ትግራይ የሆኑ የትዳር ጉዋደኞች የገቡበት ውዝግብ  ላጫውታችሁ። እነ መሃሪ፣ ኪዳኔና የመሳሰሉት ስለትግራይ ራስን መቻል ሲናገሩ አዲስ አበባ የሚኖረውና አንድ ሚልዮን ሊሆን የሚችለው የትግራይ ተወላጅ ሽብር እየገባው መሆኑ የተረዱ አይመስለኝም። የባልና ሚስቱ ጭቅጭቅ የተቀሰቀሰው ለትግራይ ተወላጆች አስጊ የሆነ ጊዜ እየመጣ ነውና ወደ ትግራይ ሄደን እንኑር በሚለው አጀንዳ ነው። መቀበል የሚገባን ሃቅ አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ የሚኖረው የትግራይ ተወላጅ ህዝብ የኢኮኖሚ አቅሙ ፈርጣማ መሆኑ ብቻ ሳይሆን ለትግራይ ክልልም የኢኮኖሚ ምሶሶ ነው። ትግራይ ላይ በግዴለሽነት የሚለፈፈው የመገንጠል ፓለቲካ ግዙፍ የኢኮኖሚ ድርሻ ያለውን አዲስ አበባ ነዋሪ የትግራይ ተወላጅ ተረጋግቶ እንዳይኖር እያደረገው ነው። ይህ ለትግራይ ክልል ኢኮኖሚ ከፍተኛ አደጋ አለው። በሬ ሆይ ሳሩን አየህና ገደሉን ሳታይ!! መቐለ ላይ ተቀምጦ መፈላሰፍ አዋቂ አያሰኝም። አዋቂነት የሚባለው አንዴ ለመናገር አስር ጊዜ ማሰብ ነው። ትግራይ የሰፈሩት ምሁራን መላ ኢትዮጵያ ተዘርቶ ስለሚገኘው የትግራይ ትውልድ ያለው ህዝብ መናገር የሚቻላቸው ቢሆንም መወሰን ግን አይችሉም። የህዝብ ይሁንታ ሳያገኙ በህዝብ ስም የሚደረሰው ድምዳሜ የአምባ ገነንነት አደገኛ ዝርያ ነው።

አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ ሆነ በሌሎች የኢትዮጵያ ከተሞች የሚኖረው የትግራይ ትውልድ ያለው ህዝብ አገሬ ነው፣ የኔ ቀየ ነው፣ የልጆቼ የትውልድ ስፍራ ነው እያለ ነው በመኖር ላይ ያለው። የትግራይ ፓለቲከኞች ሲፅፉም ሆነ ሲናገሩ ወደ ውስጣቸው ብቻ ሳይሆን ራቅ አድርገው ዙርያ ገባውን ቢያስተውሉ ይመከራል። የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ በተለይ የአዲስ አበባ ህዝብን ጨዋ ኢትዮጵያዊነት ማድነቅና ማመስገን እወዳለሁ። አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ እኮ በሰላም እየኖሩ ያሉት ትግራይ የሚገኙት ከፍተኛ የህወሓት ባለስልጣናት ቤተሰቦችም ጭምር ናቸው። የህወሓት አመራሮች ንብረቶችና ድርጅቶችም ቢሆኑ የነካቸው የለም። ፌደራል የትግራይ በጀት ቀነሰ፣ የሃራ ገበያ መቐለን ባቡር ፕሮጀክት ዘጋው የሚል ምሬት ይሰማል። በርግጥ ሆን ተብሎ ህዝብን ለመጉዳት ከሆነ የሚወገዝ ነው። በሌላ መአዝን እንደ ፌደራሉ ሆነን ብናየው ግን ክልከላው የትግራይ ፓለቲከኞች አስተዋፅኦ አለበት። ካልሆነ እንገነጠላለን የሚል ግልፅ መልእክት ከክልሉ እየተንፀባረቀ ባለበት ሁኔታ፣ በየስብሰባው የሚነገረው መረር ያለ ቁዋንቁዋ ሞባይል ጥርቅም አድርገው ቢዘጉትም መሃል አገር መድረሱ አልቀረም። የበጀት ድጎማው ሆነ የባቡሩ ፕሮጀክት ከመላ ኢትዮጵያ ግብር ከፋይ የሚገኝ እንደመሆኑ እገነጠላለሁ እያለ ለሚዝት ክልል አቅም ግንባታ ማዋል ፌደራል መንግስቱን ሊያስጠይቀው ይችላል። ክፉ አያሳስበው እንጂ የመቐለ ውሃ ፕሮጀክት የብድር እዳ ውስጥ የገባው እኮ መላ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ነው። ፍቺ ሲኖር ሰብአዊነት አይኖርም። የመቐለና አክሱም ህዝብ እኮ ውሃ እንዲያጠጣው የጠየቀው ፌደራል መንግስትን ነው። ነገር ማለባበስ ምን ይፈይዳል;

አሁን ሽብር የሚወራበት ጊዜ አልመሰለኝም። አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ እንደ በፊቱ የትግራይ ተወላጆችን የሚያጨናንቅ ነገር ብዙም አይታይም አይሰማም። ድሮውም የፓለቲከኞች አቀጣጣይነት እንጂ በህዝብ መካከል ምንም ችግር እንዳልነበረ የሚያመለክት ነው። የጦር አውርድ ፓለቲካ ይቁም! ከኩይሳ ተራራ አንፍጠር! እንደ አሜሪካ ሞትና ዘረኝነት የበዛበት አገር የለም:: መራበሽ ከጥንት ጀምሮ የኖረ የሰው ልጆች ባህርይ ነው። መንግስት ያልነበረው ዘመነ መሳፍንት የሚባል ቀውጢ ዘመን እኮ አሳልፋለች ኢትዮጵያ። ይህ የሆነው ለአንድ አመት ሳይሆን ለአንድ ምእተ አመት ነው። ትርምሱን ያመጡት መሳፍንት እንጂ ህዝቡ ስላልነበረ ነው የቆመውና ቆይቶም የተረሳው። በህዝብ የተቀሰቀሰ ቢሆን ግን አይቆምም ነበር። ያኔም እኮ አማራ ነበር፣ ኦሮሞም፣ ትግሬም፣ ከምባታም፣ ሲዳማም፣ አፋርም ነበሩ። እነዚህ ብሄሮች ያኔም ማንነታቸውን ያወቁ ነበሩ። አሁን ምን አዲስ ነገር ተፈጠረና ይበተናሉ። ራስን ማወቅ እኮ በጎ ነገር ነው፣ ማንን ይጎዳል; ሆን ተብሎ የግጭት መቀስቀሻ የፓለቲካ መሳሪያ ካልተደረገ በስተቀር። ፖለቲከኞች ተጠንቀቁ! ለግልና ለቡድን ጥቅም ብላችሁ የኢትዮጵያን ጥብቅ ቁዋጠሮ ለማላላት አትታገሉ። ኢትዮጵያ ከሌለች እናንተም እንደማትኖሩ ለማወቅ አይናችሁን ግለጡ። ተቀምጣችሁ እቃ አትስቀሉ!

ተጨማሪ ከአክሱም ፖስት (Aksum Post):

ህወሓት የትግራይን ሕዝብ ጥቅም ለኤርትራውያን አሳልፎ ሰጥቶአል:: ቀይ ባህር መሉ በሙሉ ለኤርትራ አንድሰጥ ህወሓት አድርጎአል :: ይህንንም የትግራይ ሕዝብ አልተቃወመም :; በሌላ በኩል ሀውሃት የአምራን ሕዝብ ከደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ ለብዙ ዘምናት የነሮበትን ቀይ ለቆ አንድሄድ ተባብራ  ነበር:; በተጨማሪም ህወሓት የታሪክ መሰረት የሌለውን የኦሮሞና የሱማሌ ግዛት አንዲፈጠር በማደረግ ኢትዮጵያ አንድትዳከም አድርጎአል:; በትግራይ ክፈለ ሀገር የየነበረው ግዛት   ለአፋር አንድሰጥ  አድርጎአል:; ይህም ለአፋር ሕዝብ በማሰብ ሳይሆን ትግራይ ለወድፊት ከቀይ ባህር አካባብ አንድትርቅ በመልስ ዜናዊና ሌሎች ህወሓት ውስጥ በአመራር ደረጃ ርነት የነበሩና አሁንም ያሉ ኤርትራውያን ያደረጉት ሴራ  ነው:: የትግራይ ሕዝብ በሕወሃትና በሻእብያ አንድዳከም  አየተደረገ  ነው:; ህወሓትን የተቆጣጠረው ጉጅለ ፀረ ትግራይ ነው:: ስለሆነም የትግራይ ሕዝብ በአስከፊ  ጭቆና ይገኛል :: ይህን ማስቆም የሁሉ ኢትዮጵያዊ ግዴታ ቢሆንም: የትግራይሕዝብ  የሰቀለውን እራሱ ማውረድ ይኖርበታል::

 

Prime Minister Abiy’s closing window of opportunity

By Shiferaw Abebe

Fifteen months ago, Prime Minister (PM) Abiy was received, from one end of the country to the other, like a messiah sent by God to save the troubled nation. Significantly less number of Ethiopians feel that way today, not necessarily because they think less of him, but as reality checked in, they have come to see the problems of the country are much bigger than what he has offered to solve them.  In the past few months, in particular, the PM’s leadership has been put to the test and his performance has fallen short of expectations.
The tragic incidents in Bahirdar and Addis Ababa four weeks ago have not only exposed a worrying deficiency in his government’s security intelligence, the bungled up communication in the aftermath has left the public confused, some even becoming suspicious of a nefarious scheme of sorts which the federal government has a hand in or is covering up.  Rightly or wrongly, this has created a serious credibility gap. No one more than Amharas received the PM with much enthusiasm over a year ago. Today a great many of them are having doubts or are on the fence at best.
There appears to be a semblance of calm in the Amhara region at this point, but no one can say the kilil is at peace fully. Besides raw emotions still simmering in relation to the Bahirdar tragedy, there is a broader uncertainty about the future of the country, how Amharas will fare in that future, and the role of Amhara nationalism in shaping that future.
To add salt to wound, Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) has ignited an open hostility with Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), which has garnered a trashing response from the latter. These are delicate times that if not handled carefully the confrontation between the two could degenerate into unchartered territories.  But even if this hostility remains as war of words, it will descend in history as the last straw that broke EPRDF’s back, which is not a good thing for the PM at this point in time as it will complicate matters for him in several respects.
Interestingly, not long ago, in a meeting with opposition parties, the PM had boasted how strong and internally cohesive the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was, apparently an exaggeration if not an entirely made up narrative.  Today, TPLF aside, the other three coalition partners are not on a strong footing individually or with each other.  It seems the only option the PM, as the Chair of EPRDF, has is to expedite the transformation of what will be left of EPRDF into a national party, something he should have given more attention and time to.  Adding the so-called partner parties into the coalition could inject some vitality into it, but doing so may not be as easy as it would be, say, six months ago, because few may see little incentive to jump into a sinking ship.
The Sidama kililhood crisis is another instance where the PM and his government is caught flat-footed. They saw it coming, they knew the kilil government would not be match to it, yet no more than a warning from a parliament pulpit was offered to avert it.  If a total catastrophe has been averted, the number of lives lost and the magnitude of property destroyed is still staggering.  It is not hard to imagine how much more will be lost as more and more zones take their turn is this destructive project.
The Sidama demand for kililhood is not just a simple matter of a democratic procedure sanctioned by the current constitution. It is one episode in a crude realty show of tearing a country apart. Ten or more episodes are already lined up in that region alone and, in fact, nothing under the current political system or the constitution can prevent from running an entire ninety some episodes as every ethnic group in the books stages its own drama.  The country may not hold up to the end, but even if it does, the human and material cost of this craziness will cripple her for generations to come.
Sadly, nothing seems to be in the works to stop this craziness.
The handling of instabilities should also be a matte of concern.  In the absence of a clear and concrete plan for political transition in the country, politically motivated conflicts and unrests are not prevented or handled proactively.  Instead as these get out of hand, because all kinds of players exploit them to advance their narrow political agendas, the federal government is forced to use the military, which by definition should be the last resort to deal with domestic matters. The more routinely this force is used to control politically motivated instabilities, the higher the chances for using excessive force and the faster power slips out of civilian hands. 
So, no wonder, Abiy’s government lately found itself on the receiving end of international condemnation. Freedom House and Committee for Protection of Journalists recently issued statements accusing the government for applying repressive tactics including the use of the much discredited anti-terrorism law to arrest and try journalists. Interestingly, the government’s defense to these charges have been exactly the same as the ones TPLF/EPRDF used for 27 years. True or not, they simply don’t sound right and are not going to help keep the PM’s/his administration’s favorable international image in the long term.
The fallout from the so-called ownership or special interest issue tied to Addis Ababa will only get worse as election time gets closer. True, the PM has said more than once that Addis Ababa belongs to its residents, but what remains wanting is his direct condemnation of the incendiary ownership propaganda by Oromo nationalists.  Meanwhile, his public censure of the Baladera Council has no basis of substantive except, perhaps, for an understandable irritation with its name. Because, what the Baladera Council stands for in Addis is something similar councils should be established and advocate in other cities throughout the country.  “Ownership” and administration of cities will be a key frontline in the fight between democracy/peace/unity, on one hand, and out-of-control ethno-nationalism/instability/division, on the other. Ideally, a national democratic political transition would resolve this conflict; at the very least, the PM needs to put forward a clear plan on how all cities, not just Addis Ababa, will govern themselves going forward.
Ethnic based evictions have been rampant in the past two years. In light of their magnitude and spontaneity in many cases, one may agree that they were an inevitable outcome of the divisive ethnic politics of 27 years.  However, systematic evictions have taken place in towns surrounding Addis Ababa that could and should have been stopped before they ruined the lives of thousands. The reaction from Abiy’s administration in these cases was rather muffled or delayed, especially in view of the ethnic divide in the eviction process, namely the evictors being Oromo officials and the evicted, in most reported cases, Amharas.
So, here we are, 15 months later than a highly promising start of political reform, not sure of the road ahead or if the destination will be better than the one in the past.  A year ago, the PM was leading and appeared in control of the nation’s affairs. Today, he is making missteps and playing catch up on so many fronts.
What went wrong?  The following are my conjectures:
First, a year ago, almost every change the PM effected came naturally. Not to take any thing from his accomplishments, but most of the measures he took– releasing political prisoners, reinstating press freedom, etc. –  were too obvious and highly expected that  any other reformer would have accomplish them.  Ending hostilities with Eritrea was perhaps his own signature accomplishment which still is a major achievement. He has also done commendable immediate things to stabilize the economy and reorg the military.  However, he seems to be struggling as he is faced with the structural problems that would require a clear plan and some risk taking.
He probably has no plan or is unsure about reforming the system fundamentally. 
So, second, he dithers on the hard choice not just in terms of taking actions, but also in making his convictions or positions known.  For example, we don’t know what he thinks of the current constitution – what is bad and what is good about it.  He has offered opinions how the constitution may be amended but not why or which parts of it should be amended from his perspective.  He has spoken highly of democracy but not about the constraints the current ethnocentric political system has put on its implementation. He has insisted kilil boundaries are administrative in nature, but has not openly challenged the constitution’s mandates for ethnic self governance that by definition requires boundaries, or the provisions that bestow land ownership on nations and nationalities which is at the root of the ethnically motivated evictions.
He dithers on less fundamental issues too, for example, the timing of the upcoming election. Aside from its technical feasibility which could be said is in the purview of the Election Board,  the current hostile political environment will not change sufficiently enough in the next ten months to allow for any civilized, democratic process, let alone one as elaborate as a national election.  There is, therefore, a widespread opinion that holding the election at its scheduled time would be a recipe for disaster. Those who insist on keeping the scheduled timeframe are either the ones who hope to benefit from the uncertainty and chaos or those who think more preparation time will not work in their favor. The PM for his part has implied but not stated officially that the election will take place at its scheduled time, which in itself has added to the overall political uncertainty.
Third, while the PM continues to engage opposition parties, intellectuals, the business community, civic and religious organizations and citizens at large on topic of national importance,  he does so without an apparent commitment to use their inputs and feedbacks to any effect. Most of these engagements are not formal consultations, so no hard expectations, which implies he may not feel obligated to do much more than listening to what others think. This, I think, goes to the crux of his leadership challenge, namely the lack of appreciation in the distinctive natures of his role as a PM and his role as a leader of a political transition.  In his role as a PM, it is his prerogative to ignore or listen to inputs from any group outside of his own party.  In his role as leader of a political reform, however, he is expected, indeed required, to take the opinions and inputs of stakeholders outside of his party. Because, whereas his PM role is given to him by his party, his role as a political change leader is entrusted in him by the people who rose up, suffered, and died protesting against the very party that made him a PM. Even though the pro-reform group within his party played a significant role in bringing the political change witnessed so far, it must not lost on him that the heavy lifting was done outside of his party.
What this means is, while his position as a PM, with all the resources of a federal government, may make him the most powerful person in the country, it does not make him the most resourceful or the singularly legitimate person to lead the political change process.  Without a doubt, the PM is a very resourceful leader whose intentions of making Ethiopia a better place for all I don’t doubt. But, he must admit sorting and charting out the road ahead for the country and reforming the current system requires a broad and active involvement of many stakeholders and players including from outside of his own party. 
The PM has a very narrow window of opportunity to turn things around, put the democratization process back on track and ensure stability and peace in the country. To this end he should immediately call a national convention of all major stakeholders to:

• Discuss and agree on the way forward in the short term, including on the timing and conducting of the upcoming election, and,
• Develop a roadmap for true political transition in Ethiopia including the rewriting of the constitution.

Shiferawabebe1@gmail.com

Death on the Nile Haunts Ethiopia’s Rebirth

By Marc Champion and Nizar Manek

The day Simegnew Bekele was found dying at the wheel of his Toyota Land Cruiser in central Addis Ababa—doors locked, engine running and a bullet wound to his head—he had left home holding a plane ticket and a packed bag.
The plan on that July afternoon a year ago was to return to the construction site of the vast hydroelectric dam that Simegnew had been overseeing since 2011, according to his mother-in-law, Membere Mekonnen. The project on the Nile had made its chief engineer a national hero. His was the public face of plans for a new Ethiopia that would no longer be known for famines and war, but as Africa’s powerhouse—literally.
Membere, like many Ethiopians, still doesn’t believe the police finding of suicide. “Why do you buy a ticket and pack your bag to go, if you are going to shoot yourself?” the 72-year-old said in an interview at her home in the capital, where she now cares for the youngest two of the three children he left behind.

Simegnew Bekele at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam construction site. Photographer: Gioia Forster/Picture Alliance via Getty Images
Whoever pulled the trigger, Simegnew found himself in the eye of multiple political storms that are still today battering one of Africa’s largest infrastructure projects: the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). A year after his death, a symbol of Ethiopia’s prosperous future risks becoming a reminder of the country’s struggles to shake its turbulent past.
Egypt has vigorously opposed the dam’s construction, due to concerns the project could reduce the supply of water downstream, at one point even threatening war. More than 80% of Egypt’s Nile water supply originates in the highlands of Ethiopia. But unprecedented access to officials and engineers running the dam project suggest the greatest risks to Ethiopia’s hydro-powered transformation come not from Egypt, but from internal disputes surrounding a leadership change in Addis Ababa just three months before Simegnew’s death.
The country’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, has ushered in new, more market-based ideas on how to run the economy. The previous government’s use of the dam as a training project for Ethiopia’s state-owned military industrial champion caused delays, and its removal over alleged quality failures and incompetence could cause more. Just days before Simegnew’s death, Abiy warned that on current progress it could take another decade to finish the dam, according to Ethiopian media reports.
Heightened tensions between the country’s complex patchwork of ethnic groups also threaten the project, pulling at the seams of a nation stitched from the fertile highlands and arid lowlands of a former empire. Abiy is from the country’s largest (but historically subordinate) Oromo ethnic group. His arrival displaced 27 years of ascendancy for Tigrayans, who in turn ended centuries of preeminence for Amharas.

Sources: ACLED, UNHCR, and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Almost three million Ethiopians were driven from their homes by conflict last year, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, the highest number worldwide. In June, an alleged coup attempt in the northern Amhara province left its president and Ethiopia’s top general dead. Amhara nationalists lay claim to the territory on which the Renaissance dam sits, in neighboring Benishangul-Gumuz, and where Abiy told parliament another coup had been planned to follow the one in Amhara.
Ethiopia’s “nationalities have been fighting against central governments for over 80 years,” said Sebhat Nega, a founder of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front that led a rebel takeover in 1991 and has now been marginalized under Abiy. If constitutional order isn’t restored, he added, “the Balkanization of Ethiopia is inevitable.”
The dam will be completed eventually, and there’s nothing inevitable about Ethiopia’s fragmentation. Yet Simegnew’s death brought public frustrations to a head. Thousands turned out to his funeral to demand answers on how he died, clashing with police. Conspiracy theories still swirl as to who might have killed the engineer.

Top: Cement trucks stand idle just downstream from the dam, where the Blue Nile flows toward Sudan. Bottom: The still to be completed center section of the dam, and its spillway.
As the grand name suggests, it’s hard to overstate the importance of the “Renaissance” dam to Ethiopia—Africa’s most populous nation after Nigeria—or the burden that rode on the 54-year-old engineer’s shoulders. When the government ran short of funds to pay construction costs that are certain to exceed the dam’s original 3.4 billion-euro ($3.8 billion) price tag, ordinary Ethiopians stepped in with donations. Civil servants were volunteered to give a month’s salary.
Despite a decade of annual growth rates as high as 10%, and a pipeline of major Chinese investments, Ethiopia remains a desperately poor country with a GDP per capita below $1,000. Once the dam’s 16 turbines are switched on, the 6,000-megawatt facility will increase the country’s supply of electricity by as much as 150% at a stroke. That will bring power to many among the two thirds of Ethiopia’s roughly 100 million population who have none, according to Minister for Water, Irrigation and Electricity Seleshi Bekele.

Sources: World Bank and Bloomberg

Then there’s the wider effect on the mainly agrarian economy and the region. China has agreed to build a $1.8 billion power grid to support a Chinese-built and funded high speed railway, currently plagued by power cuts, as well as to 16 special industrial zones. Electricity exports to Ethiopia’s neighbors will earn desperately needed hard currency.
Those interconnections could in turn help tame the seemingly perpetual cycle of poverty, famine and violence that has long blighted the Horn of Africa, from Somalia, to Eritrea, to Sudan and South Sudan.
“This is more than a dam, more than a job,” said Yared Girma, one of Semegnew’s deputies. “It’s the pride of Ethiopia.”

The dam sits between the last two shoulders of mountain where the Nile sweeps down from the highlands of Ethiopia, about 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the border with Sudan. Behind it, thousands have been displaced to make way for a reservoir 246 km long. The bone-white cement wall, up to 170 meters high and 1.8 km long, is complete but for the center section.
By now, the project is five years behind schedule and counting. At least 60 trucks from Salini Impregilo SpA, the contractor for the civil engineering part of the project, stand idle. The Italian company is demanding compensation and says it paused work on the concrete structure in October. On a recent day, a Nile crocodile swam slowly upstream toward the relative quiet of the construction site.

Workmen’s overalls hung out to dry at one of the dam’s two powerhouses.
Simegnew had been due to fly back here the day he died, together with a team from Metals and Engineering Corp., or Metec, the military-run Ethiopian conglomerate that was in charge of the power generation side of the dam’s construction. Within months, Metec had been removed from the project and broken up. Fourteen of the retired and serving officers in its senior management are now either in jail or fugitives, accused of corruption in different parts of the business.
New Metec management installed by the government has accused the company of failing to meet any of its contractual obligations at the dam, despite receiving almost two thirds of the money due. Seleshi, the water minister, declined to comment on the company’s removal, but said he expected the dam to be complete and the reservoir full no more than seven years after filling begins in 2020.
Metec’s work has been redistributed to foreign sub-contractors, including China Composites Group Corp., Sinohydro Corp. Ltd. and GE France SASU. Standing next to a faded sign that reads “Metec means dynamism,” GE France site supervisor Philippe Robard rolled his eyes when asked about the company’s contribution to the project. “The first two units should have been working by now,” he said, speaking of the turbines.
Italian contractor Salini said in an emailed response to questions that delays caused by Metec were mainly due to “their total lack of experience in the execution of works of this nature and magnitude.”
Down in the powerhouse at the dam’s base, Indian welders are assembling the 7 meter diameter pipes that will direct water onto those two turbines. Once complete, they’ll be drowned in concrete to prevent vibration, a rod fixed to the center of each, and a pair of 800 ton rotors lowered onto those. The same procedure will then follow for the other 14 turbines.A welder joins the pipe assembly for one of two “early generation” turbines at the dam
The new chief engineer, Kifle Horo, shared the job with Simegnew back in 2011 when the project started. He says he was removed after clashing with Metec over its proposal to change the dam’s design to increase the headline generating capacity.
The generals, Kifle said, weren’t engineers and didn’t understand that this would simply add unused capacity and cost. The dam’s potential for producing energy over a year is fixed by the volume and depth of water in its reservoir. Extra megawattage just allows the same quantity of electricity to be produced in shorter bursts.
“It’s meaningless,” Kifle said of Metec’s design change. The aim is now to start filling the reservoir next June and complete construction in 2022, though some of the previous work needs to be undone first. “There are a lot of uncertainties, because Metec erected two bottom outlets and, due to quality reasons, we have already started to remove these.”

Top: The spillway that allows water to flow out of the reservoir when it overfills. Bottom: Part of piping that will direct water into the turbines.
The man responsible for Kifle losing his tussle with Metec—and to whom Simegnew reported—was among the most powerful officials in Ethiopia’s former government, Debretsion Gebremichael. An electrical engineer by training, he said he persuaded the rest of the government to approve the design change, arguing the addition of a turbine would reduce operating costs.
Sidelined in Addis Ababa by the political changes that culminated in Abiy’s appointment as prime minister, Debretsion is now acting head of the local government in his native Tigray province, as well as chairman of the TPLF. In an interview at his office in Mekele, the regional capital, he described Simegnew as “a victim.”
Metec was added to the project for three reasons, according to Debretsion. The first was to build the company into a state-led equivalent of South Korean chaebols such as Samsung and Hyundai. Ethiopia aims to become a giant of hydropower exports and the idea was to train up local engineers who would be able to take the lead in building future dams. It was always understood that using a domestic company would take longer and that gaps in expertise would have to be filled, the Tigrayan leader said.
A second goal was to reduce the dam’s financial burden, which is being paid for without the help of international lenders. The government decided to hive off roughly 1 billion euros from the bill, giving that work to Metec to execute in local currency with (dramatically cheaper) local labor. The final motivation, according to Debretsion, was to reduce the number of foreign companies that might pull out under Egyptian pressure.

Welders working on the turbine assemblies. Soldiers at Metec’s open air cafe on the construction site.
“Stripping Metec out is completely against the original strategy,” and against Ethiopia’s long-term economic interests, said Debretsion. Simegnew, he added, believed in the approach. “He said we have to support these guys, so that they will finish this.”
Metec scoured Ethiopia’s universities for engineering graduates to work at the dam. Among them were eight interviewed for this article, all now aged 30 or younger. Until they were let go last year, they were on salaries of $163 per month or less. Now they are jobless, their resumes poisoned by association with Metec’s damaged brand.
Taye Shiferaw was 23 and fresh out of college with a degree in manufacturing when he started work at the dam four years ago. He was made team leader for quality control on the linings Kifle is concerned about, some of the dam’s most sensitive parts. If they were to leak, the immense pressure of the water and sediment rushing through the voids could erode concrete at the base of the dam and cause its collapse.
According to Taye, the military officers in charge—his boss was a major-general—couldn’t understand what the engineers reporting to them were talking about. Handed a technical report, they would just reply “Go on! No problem!” he said. Anyone who insisted on a quality control issue risked being accused of membership in the Oromo Liberation Front, at the time listed as a terrorist organization.
Many of those officers—and of the military’s top brass in general—were Tigrayans. By now, Mekele feels like a fortress for a government in exile, with Tigrayan ex-government officials and Metec executives frequenting the local Planet Hotel, and some spending evenings at the Mountain Lounge bar downtown.
At the hotel, an army major describing himself as one of Metec’s founders fiercely disputed accusations of incompetence and waste. He cited the dam’s expanded hydro-power design as proof of the company’s technical abilities. His friend, a Metec colonel with a baseball cap pulled low over his face, had just stopped in. He said he was wanted by police in Addis Ababa and was hiding in the bush outside Mekele. He came to the hotel to shower and brush his teeth.
Delays and technical difficulties arise in large infrastructure projects all over the world, said the colonel. “In my view, it was a blindly political decision” to remove Metec, and one designed to discredit Tigrayans in the former government and military, he said. Neither officer wanted to be named, for fear of repercussions from the capital.
Getachew Reda, a Planet Hotel resident and politburo member in the fragmenting coalition of ethnically based parties that has ruled Ethiopia since 1991, was to be found at the Mountain Lounge. A huge bottle of Johnny Walker Black Label whisky was draining fast on the shared table. At one point he was pulled away to dance to the Tigrayan fighting song and anthem, “We Shall Overcome.”
The break-up of Metec was also about ethnic politics, according to Getachew. Of the 14 Metec officers charged with corruption, a majority are Tigrayan. “An ethnic purge is taking place, that much I can tell you,” he said.

Membere Mekonnen, at her home in Addis Ababa. Above her, a photograph shows Simegnew with his family.
Membere Mekonnen doesn’t concern herself with such high politics. She just remembers how Simegnew’s cell phone rang without pause the day before he died, leaving him without a moment to talk to his younger son, 16, and daughter, 9. He was depressed and clearly under immense pressure that night, but he didn’t kill himself, she insists, dismissing a police statement that he had left behind a note. Police also said he called his secretary before he died, asking her to “take care of my children.”
According to the police, Simegnew shot himself with his own gun because of pressure over delays in the dam’s construction and the emerging fact that Metec had spent more of the nation’s money than its progress could justify. He didn’t die immediately. The police said they broke a window in the attempt to get him out. In his note, according to police, Simegnew said he wanted to leave the country, but was worried he couldn’t explain himself to the Ethiopian people.
Membere is waiting for her daughter, Simegnew’s estranged wife, to secure asylum in Canada, after which the children will be sent to join her. Theirs hasn’t been an easy story. Their mother left home and, before he died, their father was so busy with dam business he sometimes left them waiting in vain after promising to visit.
“He loved that dam more than his children, because he thought it would change Ethiopia,” Membere said. Like so many others, she never questions the value or necessity of the dam itself. “We lost a hero.”
Source: Data compiled by Bloomberg
Editor: Rodney Jefferson
Design: Mira Rojanasakul, Jeremy C.F. Lin and Sam Dodge

Photographer: Zacharias Abubeker/Bloomberg