By Mastewal Dessalew
Photo:
From l-r, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed with the leaders of Tigray,
Debretsion Gebremichael, and Amhara, Gedu Andargachew; Ethiopian
government
When regional powers battled for control of the
kingdom in the 18th and 19th centuries, historians called it the Age of
Princes. As the EPRDF turns fratricidal, is Ethiopia now entering its
Age of Parties?
Since it came to power as a
rebel movement in 1991, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front, under the watchful guidance of its Tigrayan core, has been an
overwhelmingly powerful political force.
The three other member parties have been largely subservient to the
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which imposed its vision,
dogma, and policies on the front, and thus the country.
But following the past two years of resistance in the most-populous
regions, Amhara and Oromia, TPLF hegemony has crumbled and its formerly
junior partners are assertive.
Yet the resulting political jujitsu among squabbling EPRDF siblings is adversely affecting the lives of millions of Ethiopians.
Angered by lost privilege and power, TPLF elements are
fomenting conflict in Qemant populated areas of Amhara to undermine the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), and
flirting with the Oromo Liberation Front in Oromia to challenge that state’s now ascendant rulers.
ADP and the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) hit back by exposing in the
media the crimes of TPLF officials such as Getachew Assefa and his
deputies at the National Intelligence and Security Service. ADP is also
openly supporting the
identity questions in Wolqait-Tegede and Raya to demonstrate to Amhara people that it is no more the servant of TPLF.
The
Qemant question is
an ADP-TPLF flashpoint, but the issues are obscured by TPLF propaganda
and destabilization. The 2016 protest in Gondar that ignited the Amhara
protests was a watershed moment in recent developments. Besides the
demonstration, the stay-home protest that eventually paralyzed the
regime started there. In addition, by showing solidarity to the protests
in Oromia, it took the struggle to the next stage. Since the start of
the resistance in Gondar, the TPLF’s influence has been waning
day-by-day, so, is has been trying to pit residents of the Gondar area
against each other.
Identity is fluid
Currently, there is no linguistic or cultural difference between
Amhara and Qemant and settlements are mixed. Centuries old
intermarriage, movement of people and urbanization has resulted in an
intermingled linguistically homogeneous society. The case of Qemant and
Amhara is just like two Americans who trace their ancestry to different
European countries. Their forefathers might have spoken different
tongues and differ in culture, but they do not.
EPRDF under the leadership of the TPLF was the government of
minorities. Being identified as the member of majority ethnicity like
the Amhara or Oromo was perceived to place someone at a disadvantage.
Therefore, some Ethiopians were eager to play-up their minority status,
even if they were predominantly Amhara or Oromo. But with the waning of
TPLF supremacy, such tactics are no longer required, and it might even
be a dangerous move in practice considering the rising ethno-nationalist
sentiment among the majority groups.
Identity is fluid in many inter-regional border areas and Amhara and
Tigray in particular. The 1991 border demarcation that ignores the
historical and natural boundaries between the two has led to bitter
controversy. In 1991, a triumphant TPLF was in the heady mood of a
victor who grabbed anything it could. But it bit off more than it can
chew by incorporating adjacent areas of Gondar (Wolqait-Tegede) and
Wollo (Raya) into Tigray. It apparently didn’t consider the long-run
ramifications of its action.
In its heyday the TPLF could dictate almost anything to its
subordinates. ADP (ANDM), a lapdog since its inception, was not in a
position to object to the annexation; it was more inclined to support it
to show its loyalty. But with the power shift, things are changing
dramatically.
Brothers at arms
TPLF’s contempt towards ADP and both parties willingness put up a
fight is a dangerous development. Abiy’s ODP (OPDO) and Oromo
ethno-nationalists see the scrap between ADP and TPLF as a great
opportunity to weaken their two rivals. They believe that a struggle
between the two would clear the way for ODP’s absolute control of the
central government.
ODP and ADP have been taking a good cop-bad cop approach to their
dealings with TPLF. While ADP is the bad cop that aggressively gave
media coverage to
the crimes of TPLF officials, ODP was the good cop that showed
restraint, until recently. It is only after the TPLF accused the
incumbents of violating the constitution at rallies in Tigray that ODP
shot back with a
program that showed victims of torture on national television.
Amid this internal rivalry, the EPRDF parties have lost a clear
unifying political ideology. Revolutionary democracy has already become
revelatory kleptocracy. It is no more a secret that multi-billion dollar
projects like the Renaissance Dam are
plagued by mismanagement and
party conglomerates like EFFORT are more a means of exploitation and
extraction than competitive and innovative entities. Most of their
wealth came from avoiding taxes, winning government contracts without
competition, getting prime urban land on the cheap, dodging loan
repayments, and similar other preferential treatment by the government.
Amidst the maelstrom, Abiy seems intent on establishing himself as supreme leader for the foreseeable. The introduction of his
Republican Guard is
reminiscent of the notorious “Abiyot Tibeka” (the Amharic phrase for
Revolutionary Guard) of Mengistu Hailemariam and Meles Zenawi’s infamous
Agazi commando force.
A powerful Prime Minister has an Achilles Heel
Both previous strongmen used such units to unleash ruthless attacks
on rivals. It seems Abiy is taking a page out of their handbooks. There
is no clarity about his new personal protection force; the news of its
formation and its televised drill was a bolt from the blue. We will see
if it is used responsibly or if it will become “Abiy/ot Guard II”.
Abiy understands that Ethiopia’s political culture is conducive to
the rise of a strongman and he is thriving on it. But this powerful
Prime Minister has an Achilles Heel. Even if he has widespread popular
support in Amhara, Addis Ababa and the South, he and his party is yet to
get such support from Oromia, the regional state his party rules.
OLF is standing in his way. To win the hearts and minds of Oromos, Abiy has been handling OLF with kid gloves, and the latter exploited the situation.
After entering the country in 2018 following the power shift, OLF is strengthening its force in all parts of Oromia and its
commanders appears
determined to match the firepower of the central government. It is
recruiting and training new fighters in areas under its control.
Recently its fighters clashed with government forces and its leaders
gave defiant press statements. To
quote Dawud Ibsa,
OLF leader, “There were conflicts in Sellalie, Bale, Guji and eastern
Wollega but the major war is going on in western Wollega.”
Selalie is in central Ethiopia, Bale in the south east, Guji in the
south and Wollega in the west. It is clear that OLF fighters are
entrenched throughout Oromia and in bordering areas that it has long had
designs on. Alemu Sime, a top ODP official,
accused the
emboldened OLF fighters, saying they’d killed officials and taken
western Oromia out of control of the government and started to tax
people.
With the strong political support it enjoys in parts of western
Oromia, OLF is in a good position in its challenge ODP both on the
battlefield and at the ballot box. In the upcoming election, there is a
chance that OLF could jeopardize the political life of Abiy and his
party in Oromia, and by extension in Ethiopia.
Unpresidented ambition
Cognizant of the danger, Abiy might be tempted to change the
parliamentary system of the country into a presidential system. Other
Oromo political parties have previously shown their appetite for such a
change. For example, in the 2005 election political debate, the founder
and leader of Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement Bulcha Demeksa
argued for a presidential system and made it clear that is his party’s aim because the Ethiopian people wanted to directly elect their leader.
Other Oromo ethno-nationalists may also prefer that, but they might
want to wait until after the coming national census, which can be used
to legitimize their false claim of Oromos comprising half the
population. According to the last census in 2007, Oromos are 34 percent
of the population, but elite ethno-nationalists have a record of
disseminating incorrect data.
For example, Ezekiel Gebissa, a history professor at Kettering University,
claimed that
“the Oromo constitute about 50 percent of the population”. Similarly,
Awol Kassim Allo, a law lecturer at Keele University in the U.K., said:
“Oromos makeup more than almost 40 percent of Ethiopia’s population”
for
CNN on March 7, 2018.
Under the leadership of ODP, there is a possibility that the upcoming
census would be tampered with and so such falsehoods legitimized. Once
done, they would push for a presidential system, or a parliamentary
system that guarantees at least half of the seats for their ethnicity.
The commission must take utmost care
But changing the system requires amending the constitution and
amending the constitution will not be a walk in the park. The founding
document of the federation is in fact a bone of contention among
Ethiopian elites.
Currently, both Tigrayan and Oromo ethno nationalists want the
existing constitution, which was primarily designed by TPLF and OLF, to
stay untouched. Whereas the Amhara argue that they were not represented
when the constitution was drafted and adopted. Among the Amhara, the
constitution is merely the political document of TPLF and OLF that
doesn’t take into account their interest.
If there is any constitutional amendment, the Amhara would fight to
gain their lost territories of Wolqait-Tegede, Raya and Metekel
(currently part of Benishangul-Gumuz region) among others. Amending the
constitution means compromising such competing interests and it would be
difficult to do it before elections considering they are less than 18
months away.
If you are wondering why the
border commission was
created, Abiy and his coterie know that it is dangerous to amend the
constitution without addressing that issue. But the border disputes
cannot be solved without changing the constitution. It is like the
chicken-and-egg causality dilemma.
In addition, the border commission could further complicate the
problem due to a lack of experience and historical, geographical and
political awareness, or even due to some short-sighted political goal.
The commission must take utmost care. There are also those, most of them
TPLF supporters, who raise a question about its
constitutionality.
The Age of Parties?
Many people think that EPRDF has somehow survived the popular revolt
of the past three years. And EPRDF has indeed survived—but in name only.
The balance of power, ideology, and relationship among member parties
has changed significantly and permanently.
ODP under Abiy is enjoying immense power in central government, but
OLF is beating them at home. Unlike ODP, ADP has no strong contender in
Amhara region, as the
National Movement of Amhara (NaMA)
is a party created with the blessing of ADP. NaMA is more of the youth
branch of reformed ADP than an adversary. NaMA’s leadership also lacks
experience. In the short run the two would cooperate rather than
compete, but with the aging of the leadership of ADP and gaining of
political experience by NaMA, the latter could become the former’s
Frankenstein.
Moreover, EPRDF in general, and ADP in particular, are in
soul-searching mode in terms of ideology and their future strategy, and
forthcoming shifts could bring unexpected conflicts of interest.
Coming to the EPRDF’s southern wing, it is suffering from an inherent
weakness of internal rivalry among different ethnic groups in Southern
Nations regional state. Most zonal administrations in the area are
demanding their
own state. Meanwhile, the ruling parties of the five non-EPRDF regions
seek a seat at the top table that they have long been denied.
Isayas is not concealing his hostility to TPLF
For the TPLF, the issue of Wolqait-Tsegede and Raya is a nightmare.
As if that is not enough, its officials’ crimes are haunting the party.
In addition, an ailing leadership is struggling to keep-up with
political developments.
Most of the TPLF top guns prospered in the past two decades and they
will lose a lot if the situation in the country gets out of control. The
location of Tigray, far from the political and geographic center, and
the much smaller size of TPLF’s constituency compared with ADP and ODP,
puts TPLF at a disadvantage. After it lost federal power, TPLF is no
more punching above its weight. But, taking into account the financial,
intelligence and military resources it amassed in the last 27 years, it
won’t go down without a fight.
It is already undermining both ODP and ADP at home, but TPLF’s gambit
could backfire as economic action including blocking roads could
intensify and power lines may also be targeted. Most electricity is
generated outside Tigray and has to cross Amhara.
Things could escalate and fracture, especially with the inflammatory
addition of Isayas Afeworki to the equation. Forgotten and desperate,
Eritrea’s autocrat never thought that he would have such a golden
opportunity. His legacy as Eritrea’s liberation hero and founding father
was tainted by his authoritarian rule and his fall into TPLF’s trap,
which alienated and impoverished Eritrea for two decades. Isayas is not
concealing his hostility to TPLF and wouldn’t hesitate to avenge his
humiliation. His legacy will be determined by how he plays this last
game to the long-term advantage of his country.
The political tit-for-tat among EPRDF parties shows it is no longer a
unified front that works for a common goal with a shared ideology. It
is a collection of factions engaged in medieval-style political intrigue
in order to become the country’s dominant force. Ethiopians are likely
to suffer increasingly as the struggle intensifies.