Bolstering Diplomatic Credentials
GCC states have expanded their diplomatic ties with sub-Saharan
African states to bolster their growing economic and security interests,
while also advancing their ambitions to play a more prominent role in
international foreign policy. Gulf states have opened dozens of new
embassies across sub-Saharan Africa in recent years and have made
assertive diplomatic interventions in African conflicts. The perception
of the United States’ withdrawal from the region has partially motivated
these interventions. Mediating conflicts is a key element of GCC
states’ aim to increase their international prestige, and their
perceived neutrality and ability to deploy substantial economic
incentives to bolster peace agreements has afforded them some notable
successes where others have failed.
In recent years, Qatar has opened the largest number of embassies in
sub-Saharan Africa of any state other than Turkey. Qatar built 11 new
embassies between 2013 and 2015 while the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait
opened nine, six, and two respectively between 2010 and 2018.
32
The UAE has announced plans to open embassies in Cote d’Ivoire and
Mauritius in 2019, while Qatar also plans to open more embassies in
sub-Saharan Africa in the near future.
33 As well as the
benefits of upgraded diplomatic relations, establishing embassies allows
Gulf states to better protect their economic and security interests and
coordinate policy more effectively. Prominent Gulf officials have also
made an increasing number of official visits to sub-Saharan Africa and
GCC states have hosted African dignitaries in recent times. Saudi
foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir recently conducted 18 shuttle visits to
Africa.
34
Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan receives Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy
Ahmed (L) and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (R) at the presidential
palace in Abu Dhabi on July 24, 2018.
The 2018 Jeddah Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is Gulf
states’ most recent mediation success, but they have facilitated peace
negotiations in sub-Saharan Africa for more than a decade. As well as
aiming to end bloodshed and instability, GCC states have engaged in
peace negotiations to bolster their international prestige (as states
have done throughout history), to gain influence in strategic locations,
and to create new economic opportunities.
35 Shortly after
Qatar negotiated a ceasefire between the Sudanese government and the
largest opposition group in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement,
it bought swathes of agricultural land in Sudan to improve its food
security.
36
Part of GCC states’ success in mediation is a result of their ability
to offer significant economic incentives. When Sudan and Chad signed a
reconciliation deal to stabilize Darfur and neighboring areas of Chad in
Saudi Arabia in 2007, the Sudanese minister of state for foreign
relations said that Saudi Arabia had promised to “help Sudan and Muslims
everywhere,” hinting at promises of financial assistance without
providing details.
37 Saudi Arabia and the UAE recently
pledged large aid and investment packages to Ethiopia and Eritrea while
mediating an end to the 20-year conflict. The UAE announced it would
provide a total of $3 billion in aid and investment to Ethiopia in June
2018 and unveiled plans to build an oil pipeline between Ethiopia and
Eritrea shortly thereafter.
38
The perception that Gulf states are relatively neutral in African
conflicts has bolstered their success in mediation. They do not carry
the weight of the legacy of European colonialism, for example. The UAE
maintained ties with Eritrea when it was isolated by the international
community, bolstering its image as a balanced negotiator between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Qatar has strived to develop a reputation as an
honest and reliable powerbroker by mediating various conflicts across
the Middle East and Africa and has played a prominent role in
negotiations between Eritrea and Sudan, Chad and Sudan, and Eritrea and
Djibouti. However, some of these mediation attempts have failed to
achieve lasting peace resolutions because of its limited power
projection capabilities, a lack of professional personnel on the ground,
and a broader lack of experience of mediating highly complex conflicts.
39
The perception that Gulf states are relatively neutral in African conflicts has bolstered their success in mediation.
The Opportunities, Risks, and Limits of GCC influence
Gulf states have leveraged their growing economic, security, and
diplomatic influence in sub-Saharan Africa to push back on their rivals’
influence and gain international backing in their own disputes. They
have promised aid and investment, offered to enhance security
cooperation, and even agreed to improve African migrants’ rights in GCC
states to encourage sub-Saharan African states to give them diplomatic
support. Gulf states successfully used these tools of influence to
convince African states to downgrade their ties with Iran, thereby
containing Iran’s presence in the Horn of Africa. But African states
have been most significantly affected by the fallout of the 2017
intra-GCC dispute, as it highlighted the risks and opportunities created
by Gulf states’ zero-sum rivalry. The Gulf crisis also revealed limits
to GCC states’ influence, showing that they have not yet managed to
achieve the loyalty of most African states.
Saudi Arabia has long sought to contain Iran’s influence in Africa,
particularly in East Africa. Iran developed a military cooperation and
intelligence sharing relationship with Sudan, using it as a shipping
point for arms to Iran’s partners and proxies in the Middle East until
2015.
40 Saudi Arabia’s offers of substantial diplomatic and
economic incentives to break ties with Iran proved sufficient. It helped
free Sudan from its diplomatic isolation and deposited $1 billion in
Sudan’s central bank in 2015, shortly before Sudan cut ties with Iran.
41 Saudi
Arabia also signed a security agreement with Djibouti as it finalized a
deal to build a military base there, enhancing its military projection
capabilities and further countering Iran’s influence.
42 These diplomatic, economic, and security tools have reduced Iran’s influence in the Horn of Africa significantly.
The Gulf crisis also revealed limits to GCC states’ influence,
showing that they have not yet managed to achieve the loyalty of most
African states.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have had less success in containing Qatar’s
influence in Africa, and the intra-GCC rivalry has had a destabilizing
impact on parts of the Horn of Africa. When the Quartet powers of Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt broke ties with Qatar on June 5,
2017, they sought the backing of sub-Saharan African states. Comoros,
Eritrea, Mauritania, Mauritius, and Senegal all stood with the Quartet
and cut ties with Qatar, while Chad, Djibouti, and Niger downgraded
their ties. Many of these states received aid and investment from Saudi
and UAE bodies in the following months, indicating that even if they
were not offered these incentives as a direct exchange for their
diplomatic solidarity, they received economic rewards shortly afterward.
The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center provided over $250
million in aid for refugees in Djibouti in August 2017, and Saudi Arabia
signed agreements to advance trade, investment, and tourism cooperation
with Mauritius the following month.
43 Meanwhile, the Abu
Dhabi Fund for Development made $50 million available for Emirati
companies wishing to invest in Chad and gave Comoros a grant of over $10
million to bolster its electricity network.
44
However, prominent states in sub-Saharan Africa resisted Saudi and
Emirati pressure and remained neutral, revealing limits to GCC states’
influence in the region. Despite receiving significant investment
packages from Saudi Arabia in the years preceding the Gulf crisis, Sudan
refused to take sides in what its foreign ministry described as a
“sorrowful development” and offered to mediate instead.
45 Qatar
was a prominent investor that Sudan could not afford to lose. South
Africa also opted to remain neutral, with the South African ambassador
to Doha saying his country would resist pressure from the UAE and Saudi
Arabia to isolate Qatar because doing so would be “against the values
Mandela fought for.”
46 The Nigerian foreign minister stated
that he had come under pressure from both sides to back them but
reaffirmed Nigeria’s neutrality.
47 The president of the
African Union, President Alpha Condé of Guinea, wrote to King Salman of
Saudi Arabia calling for dialogue and expressing support for Kuwaiti
mediation.
48
Meanwhile, Qatar pushed back by exerting its own influence. The
Qatari emir toured Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and
Senegal in December 2017 in a challenge to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Qatar’s agreements to cooperate on counterterrorism with Burkina Faso
and Mali were particularly significant, as one of the Quartet’s
principal accusations against Qatar was its support for terrorism
abroad.
49 Senegal and Chad reinstated diplomatic relations with Qatar in August 2017 and February 2018 respectively.
50
Some African countries have managed to benefit from the dispute by
enhancing economic ties with Gulf states on both sides of the GCC feud,
in effect playing them off against each other. South Africa increased
its commercial trade with Qatar by 70 percent after the blockade was
imposed and specifically offered to help Qatar overcome its subsequent
food insecurity resulting from regional isolation.
51 Meanwhile,
South Africa accepted a $10 billion investment pledge from the UAE,
focusing on the mining and tourism sectors, and an additional $10
billion pledge from Saudi Arabia, focusing on its energy sector.
52
Sudan has also continued to receive investment from both Qatar and
Saudi Arabia since the blockade. In March 2018, Qatar and Sudan signed a
$4 billion deal to manage a Red Sea port jointly, and the Saudi
ambassador to Sudan announced in October 2018 that the Kingdom now
invests more than $12 billion in Sudan.
53 Ethiopia has
benefited from new investment pledges from various Gulf states, as well
as negotiating improved rights for its migrant workers in the UAE.
54
These African states have managed to benefit significantly from Gulf
states’ attempts to woo them, while resisting GCC states’ attempts to
force them to take sides.
Some African countries have managed to benefit from the dispute by
enhancing economic ties with Gulf states on both sides of the GCC feud.
Yet, the zero-sum rivalry between GCC states has also carried great
risks for more vulnerable African states. Somalia came under intense
pressure to choose a side in the dispute. It enjoyed close ties with
Qatar’s ally Turkey, which donated more than $1 billion in aid, but was
also highly dependent on Saudi Arabia, its largest export partner, and
enjoyed a close security partnership with the UAE. When Somali president
Farmajo refused to support Saudi Arabia and the UAE, reportedly turning
down a large aid package, a diplomatic spat escalated resulting in the
UAE increasing its support for Somalia’s federal states and ending a
military training program. The European Parliament passed a resolution
condemning the UAE and Saudi Arabia for depriving Somalia of regular
budgetary support payments, saying the move destabilized the country by
weakening the government’s ability to pay its security forces.
55 Emirati officials said support would only be reinstated when Farmajo apologized for his “unfounded allegations.”
56
The threat of instability also arose in Djibouti when Qatar withdrew
its peacekeeping forces from the Eritrean border in retaliation for
Djibouti’s and Eritrea’s support of the Quartet in the dispute.
57
Eritrea claimed control over the disputed territories of Mount Dumeira
and the island of Dumeira, prompting the UN secretary general’s
spokesperson to warn that the GCC conflict was affecting the African
side of Bab al-Mandeb.
58
Outlook
GCC states’ interventions in sub-Saharan Africa bring important
opportunities for African states, and some have even benefited from Gulf
rivalries. Several sub-Saharan African states have seized the
opportunity to expand their economic ties with states on both sides of
the dispute, effectively playing them off against each other. More
broadly, Gulf states will likely continue their efforts to expand their
trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa as they pursue their
economic diversification plans. Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s successful
mediation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict may also encourage Gulf
states to use their growing influence to expand their role as
powerbrokers in Africa or beyond. Emirati officials, for example,
suggested that the UAE would be well-placed to negotiate the dispute
over the Nile between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia and is ready to do so.
59The
Saudi minister of state for Africa recently indicated support for more
assertive interventions throughout Africa. He stated that Saudi Arabia’s
lack of engagement in Africa had created opportunities for other states
to “cause troubles” and remarked that Saudi Arabia was now “on the
right track” to deepen ties with every African country.
60Meanwhile,
Emirati officials said the UAE did not need to change its approach but
intended to continue to deepen and broaden ties across Africa.
61
But as GCC states’ economic and security interests in Africa grow and
their interventions become more assertive, the impact of their
rivalries in Africa is becoming increasingly damaging. Their zero-sum
rivalry has provoked retaliations, which have dangerously destabilized
vulnerable parts of Africa. New tensions are also arising. Although GCC
states have effectively contained Iran’s influence in East Africa, Iran
maintains influence in West Africa, which is increasingly the site of
Arab Gulf interventions. Tensions between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Turkey in the Horn of Africa are also rising. Turkey has increased its
interventions in Africa substantially in the past 15 years. Since 2003,
Turkey has increased its trade with Africa six-fold to $17.4 billion,
built 29 new embassies, and opened its first overseas African base in
Somalia.
62 Turkey’s attempts to bolster its presence in the
Red Sea by restoring the Sudanese port on Suakin Island create an
additional source of tension with Gulf states.
63 For Saudi
Arabia, the stakes are getting higher. Meanwhile, the United States’
reduced commitment to the region means it is missing opportunities to
mitigate the consequences of regional crises.
Implications for policymakers in the United States
As GCC states consolidate their status as important actors in
sub-Saharan Africa, new opportunities are emerging for the United States
to cooperate with its Gulf partners in the region. U.S. policymakers
could further capitalize on GCC states’ desire to prove their
credentials as serious partners in counterterrorism to share the burden
of the security role in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, opportunities to
collaborate on conflict mediation exist. Peace negotiations could
benefit from a combination of GCC states’ ability to offer African
actors substantial economic incentives and U.S. diplomats’ extensive
experience with the history and complexity of African conflicts. Gulf
states can also help advance the United States’ development goals in
sub-Saharan Africa. More extensive collaboration in building
infrastructure and urban development would be especially worthwhile.
U.S. policymakers could further capitalize on GCC states’ desire to
prove their credentials as serious partners in counterterrorism to share
the burden of the security role in sub-Saharan Africa.
However, as GCC states’ presence in sub-Saharan Africa continues to
expand, U.S. policymakers should expect them to act increasingly
independently and less in concert with Western states. Gulf states have
not always shared the United States’ emphasis on and concern for
governance issues in Africa. Differing approaches and priorities could
increasingly prove an obstacle to collaboration attempts, and given Gulf
states’ relative success in Africa, there is no reason to assume they
would wish to adjust to the U.S. approach. The potential for intra-GCC
rivalries to affect Gulf states’ policies in sub-Saharan Africa also
represents a challenge to collaboration with the United States, as U.S.
policymakers may find it harder to predict Gulf states’ behavior and
reach consensus between them.
More broadly, the United States could learn from GCC states’ economic
approach to Africa. The United States is currently ceding opportunities
for economic investment in Africa to other powers, including China,
Turkey, and the Gulf states. Part of the reason for the United States’
disengagement from Africa may be that it does not fear security threats
emanating from Africa to the same degree Gulf states do. However, that
should not prevent the United States from sharing Gulf states’ view that
Africa is an important area for economic growth.
Implications for policymakers in Arab Gulf states
Gulf states often favor a unilateral approach in their interventions
in sub-Saharan Africa, but they could benefit from working in
partnership with like-minded international powers. As GCC states rapidly
expand their global footprint, they will need to commit significant
resources to protect it. Although they need to be prepared to step in
when instability poses risks to their interests, increasing multilateral
cooperation on security would be an effective way of protecting GCC
states’ economic interests, while also building the capacity of their
own security apparatuses and sharing the security burden. As they
increase their mediating role in Africa, Gulf states could also benefit
from the experience of countries that have historically had deeper ties
with sub-Saharan Africa and more extensive involvement in diplomatic
negotiations, such as the United States and European powers. When
seeking economic collaborations, Gulf policymakers will need to be
sensitive to other powers’ differing priorities. Western donors are
particularly sensitive about corruption issues, for example, and are
more likely to impose strict conditions on investment activities.
As GCC states increase their interventions in Africa, they must
continue to broaden and deepen their ties with African states. To secure
their economic interests in an arena of greater international
competition, they should enhance their lateral engagement with African
governments significantly to ensure that their interventions are meeting
African governments’ needs and priorities. Such engagement will help
ensure that African governments continue to view them as attractive
partners and make interventions safer and more sustainable. Part of this
approach should involve building people-to-people ties. GCC states
should expand opportunities for educational exchange, training
collaborations, and tourism links with countries in sub-Saharan Africa
to capitalize on the potential of young people in Africa and enhance
their reputation more broadly.
Will Todman is an associate fellow in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
This brief is made possible in part through the generous support of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates.
CSIS Briefs are produced by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private,
tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues.
Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take
specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and
conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be
solely those of the author(s).
© 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
1 “King Salman Sponsors the Jeddah Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea” Al Hayat, September 18, 2018, https://bit.ly/2Nmo5Tp.
2 “Dubai Chamber Report Explores Entrepreneurs’ Role in
Bolstering Africa-GCC Economic Ties” Dubai Chamber of Commerce, October
28, 2017,
http://www.dubaichamber.com/whats-happening/chamber_news/dubai-chamber-report-explores-entrepreneurs-role-in-bolstering-africa-gcc-economic-ties.
3 “South Africa says Saudi Arabia to invest $10 billion in the Country, Focus on Energy,” Reuters, July 12, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-saudi-energy/saudi-arabia-to-invest-at-least-10-billion-in-southafrica-focus-on-energy-south-africa-presidency-idUSKBN1K22JR.
4 “Sudan, Qatar to sign $4 billion deal to manage Red Sea port – ministry,” Reuters, March 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-qatar/sudan-qatar-to-sign-4-billion-deal-to-manage-red-sea-port-ministry-idUSKBN1H22WH.
5 “China’s Xi pledges $60 billion in financing for Africa,” Associated Press, September 3, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/1fc21c4b22144b26bf1253d8f5c623c1; Judd Devermont, “The World is Coming to Sub-Saharan Africa. Where is the United States?” CSIS Briefs, August 24, 2018, 3, https://www.csis.org/analysis/world-coming-sub-saharan-africa-where-united-states.
6 Data accessed from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/are/show/all/2016/
7 Data accessed from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/are/show/all/2016/
8 Wim Plaizier, “Two truths about Africa’s agriculture,” World Economic Forum, January 22, 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/how-africa-can-feed-the-world/.
9 Author’s interview with Qatari official, October 2018;
Eckart Woertz, Samir Pradhan, Nermina Biberovic, and Chan Jingzhong,
“Potential for GCC Agro-investments in Africa and Central Asia,” Gulf
Research Center, September 2008, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111335/Potential_for_GCC_Agro_5729.pdf.
10 Michael Wilerson, “Why is Saudi Arabia buying up African farmland?” Foreign Policy, July 15, 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/07/15/why-is-saudi-arabia-buying-up-african-farmland/.
11 “Qatar invests half billion dollars in Sudan agriculture, food sectors,” Al Araby, June 20, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/6/30/qatar-invests-half-billion-dollars-in-sudan-agriculture-.
12 Nick Wadhams, “Kenyan activists fight land deal with Qatar,” The National, June 6, 2009, https://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/kenyan-activists-fight-land-deal-with-qatar-1.517567.
13 In 2011, Saudi Arabia provided the largest donation from a
Muslim country to the United Nations’ Somalia famine appeal, swiftly
giving $50 million. “Saudi Arabia donates $50 million to save the lives
of Somali children,” World Food Programme, August 23, 2011, https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/saudi-arabia-donates-us50-million-help-save-lives-somali-children.
14 For example, Islamic charities have built mosques and
wells, funded Qur’anic schools, and built orphanages as well as provided
humanitarian relief in Africa. See: African Muslims Agency South Africa
website, https://africamuslimsagency.co.za/achievements/.
15 Mayke Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa” in Robert Lacey and Jonathan Benthall, Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the “Age of Terror” and Beyond (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2014), 82.
16 Tom Heneghan, “Special Report: Gaddafi’s secret missionaries,” Reuters, March 29, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-missionary/special-report-gaddafis-secret-missionaries-idUSBRE82S07T20120329.
17 Kaag, “Gulf Charities in Africa,” 79-94.
18 Senegal is the only sub-Saharan African country to have hosted IOC summit, having hosted the 6th and 11th summits in Dakar in 1991 and 2008. “Islamic Summit,” Organization of Islamic Cooperation, https://www.oic-oci.org/confdetail/?cID=6&lan=en.
19 Marko Valenta and Jo Jakobsen, “Nexus of armed conflicts
and migrations to the Gulf: Migrations to the GCC from war-torn source
countries in Asia, Africa, and the Arab neighborhood,” Middle Eastern Studies, 54:1 (2018).
20 Rashid Abdi, “A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the
Inter-Arab Crisis is Fuelling Regional Tensions,” International Crisis
Group, August 3, 2017,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/dangerous-gulf-horn-how-inter-arab-crisis-fuelling-regional-tensions;
Valenta and Jakobsen, “Nexus of armed conflicts and migrations to the
Gulf”; Preeti Kannan, “UAE to stop issuing work visas to Ethiopian
labourers and domestic help,” The National, August 2, 2012, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-to-stop-issuing-work-visas-to-ethiopian-labourers-and-domestic-help-1.398079.
21John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (Pluto Press: London, 2002), 15.
22James Bridger and Jay Bahadur, “The Wild West in East Africa,” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-wild-west-in-east-africa/.
23 Alex Mello and Michael Knights, “West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates,” War on the Rocks, September 2, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates/.
24 “The United Arab Emirates Joins an Exclusive Club,” Stratfor Worldview, December 8, 2016, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/uae-joins-exclusive-club.
25 “Djibouti finalizing deal for Saudi Arabian military base,” Financial Times, January 17, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/c8f63492-dc14-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce.
26 Giorgio Cafiero, “Sudan gets $2.2B for joining Saudi Arabia, Qatar in Yemen war,” Al Monitor, November 23, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/sudan-saudi-arabia-war-yemen-houthi-economy.html.
27 “Saudi Arabia to sign economic and defense cooperation with Sudan,” Al Bawaba, May 7, 2018, https://www.albawaba.com/business/saudi-arabia-sign-economic-and-defence-cooperation-sudan-1127524.
28 “UAE ends programme to train Somalia’s military,” Reuters, April 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-somalia-military/uae-ends-programme-to-train-somalias-military-idUSKBN1HM0Y5.
29 Kamal Alam and Wajahat S Khan, “Saudi Arabia’s Islamic
Anti-Terrorism Effort: A Coalition of the Willing of an Anti-Iran
Front?” Royal United Services Institute, December 6, 2017, https://rusi.org/commentary/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-islamic-anti-terrorism-effort-coalition-willing-or-anti-iran-front.
30 Of the 41 member countries in the IMCTC, 21 are from
sub-Saharan Africa. See: “Member Countries,” Islamic Military Counter
Terrorism Coalition, https://imctc.org/English/Members.
31Author’s interview with Emirati official, October 2018;
President Trump cited “historic change” in the Middle East with Gulf
countries contributing more to counterterrorism efforts “thanks to our
approach” in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on
September 25, 2018. See: “Remarks by President Trump to the 73 rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY,” White House, September 25, 2018,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/.
32 An official in the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation (MOFAIC) told the author the UAE opened the
following embassies between 2010 and 2018: Ethiopia (2010); Kenya
(2012); Guinea (2015); Angola, Mozambique, and Seychelles (2016); Chad
and Ghana (2017); Rwanda (2018); it also reopened its embassy in Somalia
in 2014 which had been closed since 1992 and opened a consulate in
Djibouti in 2012. Data for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait from
Devermont, “The World is Coming to Sub-Saharan Africa.”
33 “UAE to establish Cote d’Ivoire embassy, Tanzania consulate,” Gulf Business, August 13, 2018, http://gulfbusiness.com/uae-establish-cote-divoire-embassy-tanzania-consulate/; “Reinforcing economic and bilateral ties with the United Arab Emirates,” Economic Development Board Mauritius, April 2018, http://www.edbmauritius.org/Newsletter/2018/April/cooperation.html; Author’s interview with Qatari official, October 2018.
34 “Qattan: We have reversed the effects of disturbances and troubles in Africa,” Asharq al-Awsat, September 14, 2018, https://bit.ly/2NGBpBn.
35 Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4, (Autumn 2011), 541.
36 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar’s mediation initiativies,” NOREF Policy Brief, February 2013, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/160109/da1df25567ebd34af26d634892934b03.pdf.
37 “Sudan, Chad sign reconciliation deal in Saudi,” Reuters, May 3, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-chad-deal/sudan-chad-sign-reconciliation-deal-in-saudi-idUSL037019420070503.
38 “UAE to give Ethiopia $3 billion to ease foreign currency shortage,” Africa News, June 16, 2018, http://www.africanews.com/2018/06/16/uae-to-give-ethiopia-3-billion-to-ease-foreign-currency-shortage/; “Assab to Addis Ababa: UAE plans Ethiopia-Eritrea oil pipeline,” Africa News, August 11, 2018, http://www.africanews.com/2018/08/11/assab-to-addis-ababa-uae-plans-ethiopia-eritrea-oil-pipeline/.
39 Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari foreign policy,” 556.
40 Gerald Feierstein and Craig Greathead, “The Fight for
Africa: The new focus of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry,” Middle East
Institute Policy Focus 2017-2, September 2017, 1, https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF2_Feierstein_AfricaSaudiIran_web_4.pdf; “Iran plays major role in Sudan arms sector, study finds,” AFP, May 12, 2014, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-plays-major-role-in-sudan-arms-sector-study-finds/.
41 “Saudi Arabia deposits $1bn in Sudan central bank,” AFP, August 13, 2015, https://gulfnews.com/news/mena/sudan/saudi-arabia-deposits-1b-in-sudan-central-bank-1.1566103.
42 “Djibouti finalizing deal for Saudi Arabian military base,” Financial Times, January 17, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/c8f63492-dc14-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce.
43 “Yemen refugees in Djibouti benefit from over $250 million in Saudi aid,“ Asharq al-Awsat, August 27, 2017, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/theaawsat/news-middle-east/saudi-arabia/yemen-refugees-djibouti-benefit-250-million-saudi-aid; “Mauritius and Saudi Arabia to consolidate existing bilateral relations,” Republic of Mauritius, September 12, 2017, http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Mauritius-and-Saudi-Arabia-to-consolidate-existing-bilateral-relations.aspx.
44 “Abu Dhabi fund allocates $50m for Chad investments,” Arabian Business, September 14, 2017, https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/banking-finance/378661-abu-dhabi-fund-allocates-50-for-chad-investments;
“ADFD earmarks AED40 million grant to bolster electricity network in
Comoros,” WAM (Emirates News Agency), September 23, 2017, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302634030.
45 “Sudan: Foreign Ministry issues statement on step of Arab countries to cut relations with Qatar,” All Africa, June 5, 2017, https://allafrica.com/stories/201706060265.html.
46 “South Africa rejects Saudi, UAE pressure to boycott Qatar,” Middle East Monitor, July 21, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180721-south-africa-rejects-saudi-uae-pressure-to-boycott-qatar/.
47 Anthony Harwood, “Qatar: Nigeria Calls for Lift of Blockade,” The Nation, October 4, 2017, http://thenationonlineng.net/qatar-nigeria-calls-for-lift-of-blockade/.
48 Tamba Simika, « Crise du Golfe : Alpha Condé se pose en médiateur » Deutsche Welle, June 12, 2017, https://www.dw.com/fr/crise-du-golfe-alpha-cond%C3%A9-se-pose-en-m%C3%A9diateur/a-39219624.
49 “Qatar boosts ties with Mali, Burkina Faso,” The Peninsula , December 22, 2017, https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/22/12/2017/Qatar-boosts-ties-with-Mali,-Burkina-Faso.
50 “Senegal restores its ambassador to Qatar,” Anadolu Agency, August 22, 2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/senegal-restores-its-ambassador-to-qatar/890618; “Chad and Qatar restore ties cut in wake of Arab states rift,” Reuters, February 21, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-chad/chad-and-qatar-restore-ties-cut-in-wake-of-arab-states-rift-idUSKCN1G515I.
51 “Qatar-South Africa trade rises by 70 percent post siege,” The Peninsula, August 29, 2018, https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/29/08/2018/Qatar,-South-Africa-trade-rises-by-70-post-siege-Envoy; “South Africa keen to assist Qatar on food security needs: Envoy,” The Peninsula, March 18, 2018, https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/18/03/2018/South-Africa-keen-to-assist-Qatar-on-food-security-needs-Envoy
52 “UAE pledges $10bn in investment, South Africa says,” Gulf Business, July 15, 2018, http://gulfbusiness.com/uae-pledges-10bn-investment-south-africa-says/
; Justina Crabtree, “Saudi Arabia to power up South Africa’s energy
sector with multi-billion dollar investment,” CNBC, July 13, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/saudi-arabia-to-invest-billions-in-south-africa-energy.html.
53 “Sudan, Qatar set to sign $4 billion Red Sea port deal,” Al-Araby , March 27, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/3/27/sudan-qatar-set-to-sign-4-billion-port-deal; “Ja’afar: The Kingdom’s current investments in Sudan exceed $12 billion,” Al-Riyadh, October 21, 2018 http://www.alriyadh.com/1712329.
54 Nick Webster and Anna Zacharias, “UAE agreement with Ethiopia will further protect rights of domestic workers,” The National, August 14, 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-agreement-with-ethiopia-will-further-protect-rights-of-domestic-workers-1.759812.
55 “European Parliament Resolution on Somalia 2018/2784,” European Parliament, April 7, 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P8-RC-2018-0323&format=XML&language=EN.
56Author’s interview with Emirati officials, October 2018.
57 “Qatar withdraws troops from Djibouti-Eritrea border mission,” Reuters, June 14, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-djibouti/qatar-withdraws-troops-from-djibouti-eritrea-border-mission-idUSKBN1950W5.
58 “Power play, spurred by Iran’s ambitions, make waves in Red Sea,” The Arab Weekly, April 24, 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/power-plays-spurred-irans-ambitions-make-waves-red-sea.
59 Author’s interview with Emirati officials, October 2018.
60 “Qattan: We have reversed the effects of disturbances and troubles in Africa,” Asharq al-Awsat, September 14, 2018, https://bit.ly/2NGBpBn.
61 Author’s interview with Emirati officials, October 2018.
62 “Turkey reaping rewards of ‘Opening to Africa’,” Anadolu Agency, February 27, 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-reaping-rewards-of-opening-to-africa/1075334.
63 Youssef Sheiko, “The United Arab Emirates: Turkey’s New
Rival,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Fikra Forum, February
16, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-united-arab-emirates-turkeys-new-rival.
